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Foreword
Addressing a group of innovators in Berlin in 2014, Google’s executive chairman Eric 
Schmidt used his speech to take an oblique swipe at the European competition authorities, 
‘...someone, somewhere in a garage is gunning for us,’ said Schmidt, ‘I know, because 
not long ago we were in that garage’. By invoking the idea that invention comes from the 
unexpected and that barriers to entry have disappeared in a digital world, Schmidt repeated 
a familiar mantra within the technology world, that nothing is for ever and everything is 
easily challenged by the market.
In this prescient and important paper Tech Giants and Civic Power Dr Martin Moore carefully 
dismantles the thesis that the market will be a corrective to the extraordinary concentration 
of both economic power and civic influence  within a small number of technology behemoths. 
Furthermore he does what few scholars or politicians have managed thus far, and advances the 
proposition that we ought to think about new mechanisms of oversight and regulation for a new 
type of power.
In the past twenty years the proliferation of internet technologies  has radically transformed 
almost every aspect of life; how we buy products, discuss politics, form relationships and 
conduct our work. At the heart of this change sit a small number of companies who grasped 
the early possibilities of a widely available internet and turned them into vast generators of 
wealth and insight. Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon between them control and collect 
unprecedented amounts of data about human activity and turn it into products and services that 
have fuelled stunning commercial growth.
Unlike previous great corporate entities their power resides in the databases of human activity 
which provide the internal engine for dynamic growth. Google can use image and sensing 
data, predictive analytics and mapping software to put driverless cars on the roads. Facebook 
is able to analyse and predict sentiment through the way people communicate with each other, 
Amazon knows what you might want to buy next before you know it yourself. Apple, through 
its smartphone technologies and payment mechanisms, knows how and when you communicate 
with your mother, your bank and your boss. Collectively these companies also make decisions 
for us, such as what news stories we see first in the morning, which services are recommended 
to us first, how our histories and foibles will be shown to the world. Which information will 
circulate freely and which will be stopped.
Martin Moore deftly demonstrates how the civic value of these communications and search 
platforms is enmeshed within their business models. Unpicking these ‘network effects’ to enable 
more effective commercial competition is not a straightforward proposition, not least because 
politicians and lawyers themselves often don’t understand the nature or possibilities of the new 
power themselves. Martin Moore’s manifesto for understanding is timely and clear, as he writes:
‘... it is necessary and urgent that democratic societies better understand this power. 
Otherwise there is a risk that it is not used constructively or responsibly, that citizens do 
not have adequate protection from the use or misuse of this power, or that democratic 
governments respond to this power in ways that are regressive or even harmful to citizens.’
Everyone should read Tech Giants and Civic Power, both to understand the issues, and also to 
engage in the conversation we must have about the solutions.
Emily Bell
Director of the Tow Centre for Digital Journalism at Columbia University
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1Preface
This study is about the new and growing phenomenon of global tech giants, 
their increasing civic power, and what this means for democracies. It might best 
be described as an essay, in the sense of an extended argument and a series of 
observations and provocations. It aims to open debate about the role of the tech 
giants – notably Google, Facebook, Apple and others – in democracy and civic 
life, as distinct from their impact on privacy and security, or their economic and 
financial status.
The study presents a new conceptual framework for considering their role, based 
on the democratic functions they are starting to perform and in the light of their 
increasing dominance. It ends on the knotty question of how democratic societies 
should respond. Given the relative failure of most responses to date, coupled with 
the speed of change, it suggests that this question is fast becoming urgent. A detailed 
exploration of existing and potential responses is, however, beyond the bounds of this 
short paper. That is for a future study.
My hope is that the ideas introduced here, and the questions asked, will stimulate 
responses and generate a wider discussion. Such a discussion is, I believe, much 
needed and overdue. The thoughts and views expressed are mine alone.
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1 | Responding to digital dominance
2
3The size and dominance of the new tech giants raise critical civic questions for 
democratic societies – questions we cannot yet adequately answer.
On 2 July 1890 the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in the US, making illegal – 
for the first time in US history – monopolistic business practices. The Act remains the 
basis of US antitrust legislation over 125 years later. It also formed the foundation of 
subsequent antitrust legislation in Europe.1
The Act passed through the House of Representatives by 242 votes for to none 
against, and through the Senate by 52 votes to 1. It passed, in other words, almost 
unanimously. In the 51st Congress, first session:
‘Not a single voice spoke up either in favor of, or expressing any neutrality 
toward trusts, although some members of Congress urged caution, particularly in 
reference to the constitutional right to act. The greatest vehemence was expressed 
by representatives from the Mid-West. There was no question as to the need for 
legislation: the problem was what form it should take.’2
Yet, only three years previously antitrust was neither a political nor a public issue. 
There was almost no discussion of Trusts in either Congress or Senate prior to 1887, 
and little coverage across newspapers, magazines or in newspapers, magazines or 
pamphlets. This despite the fact that there had been six major industry consolidations 
between 1860 and 1887.3
Within the space of three years, concern about the consolidation of industry into 
large Trusts had emerged from almost nowhere as a political issue to grow into a surge 
of political and popular support in favour of fundamental reform. This happened in an 
era long before broadcast radio or television, and a century before the invention of the 
World Wide Web. Public fear of large unaccountable corporate power was such that 
both right and left on the political spectrum came together (Senator John Sherman 
was himself a Republican) to agree legal reforms.
The Sherman Act was then strengthened by the Clayton Act of 1914. ‘Together 
with the Sherman Act,’ Andrea Wigger writes, ‘they constitute the ‘Magna Carta’ 
of free enterprise’.4 To this day the Trusts are infamous in US political and economic 
history and have helped frame American attitudes to monopoly, competition and 
corporate power.
Some of the Silicon Valley corporations of the 21st century are, in many ways, 
bigger and more dominant than the Trusts of the late nineteenth. They are amongst 
the most valuable companies in the world. Their revenues – even in real terms – dwarf 
those of their nineteenth counterparts. In certain markets, like general search, they 
hold close to monopoly market share.
The questions these tech giants raise are also more complex since they go far 
beyond the economic. Whilst there are major questions about their economic power, 
about their liability for tax, and about the nature of digital monopolies, they also raise 
fundamental questions about security and privacy. Yet amongst the most complex and 
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4least considered questions they raise are about their civic role, in other words, their 
contribution to citizens’ ability to play a full and free role in the societies in which 
they live. Almost accidentally, these global tech giants have taken on civic roles, and 
with these roles, civic power. This includes the power to enable collective action, the 
power to communicate news, and the power to influence people’s vote.
It is this civic power that this study focuses on. The study identifies six civic powers 
that these transnational information intermediaries have acquired. It describes the 
many positive ways in which these powers have been used to the benefit of democratic 
society. It also outlines the ways in which the powers these organisations have 
acquired may be abused, and the danger of democratic societies relying so heavily on 
a small number of private commercial companies to perform these public purposes.
The growing civic status of these organisations would be less of an issue were it not 
for their size and reach. By 2015 more than half the online global population of three 
billion people were using one or more of these services (1.5 billion using Facebook 
alone). At the same time the growth in their use continued at a dizzying pace.
Their scale and dominance makes it inevitable that, as they take on civic 
functions, democratic governments will respond – particularly through legislation and 
regulation. Some of these responses will have a critical and long-term impact – as the 
Sherman Act of 1890 did. The responses themselves could happen quickly yet their 
repercussions may take many decades to play out, as happened with antitrust.5
It is vital that these responses, particularly by democratic societies and the 
organisations themselves, are better considered and better informed than they have 
been to date. Yet for them to be better considered and informed will require much 
greater thought and effort than we have seen so far.
The central thesis of this study is split into two parts. The first part lays out the 
scale, reach and dominance of the major information intermediaries by late 2015, and 
sets this in the context of their ambitions and aspirations. The second examines the 
civic roles these tech giants are now playing, and the power they now have in the civic 
realm.
The aim of the study is threefold. It is intended to identify the civic powers that 
these organisations and their services are acquiring. It is to encourage the corporations 
themselves to recognize the powers they now have and devise better ways to use them 
responsibly. And, by identifying some of the potential dangers of digital dominance, 
it is to help start to inform the inevitable government responses to these organisations 
– responses that will have repercussions far beyond the organisations themselves, and 
could be instrumental in the structure of future digital societies.
The study then concludes with a plea for democratic publics and their governments 
to take the civic power of these giants more seriously, and to put more effort into 
considering how to respond to the questions they raise. 
5Who are the ‘tech giants’?
There is considerable confusion as to what constitutes a ‘tech giant’ beyond simply 
their size and their focus on technology. 
Some have attempted to create a new industry category of ‘online intermediaries’ or 
‘online platforms’. The European Commission used these two terms interchangeably 
in a consultation it started in 2015, explaining the definition as meaning: ‘internet 
search engines, social media, knowledge and video sharing websites, news 
aggregators, app stores and payment systems.’6 The UK House of Lords also 
launched an inquiry into ‘online platforms’ in autumn 2015, though it described this 
as including everything from ‘marketplaces such as Amazon and eBay, to sharing 
economy platforms such as Airbnb and Uber, to social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter.’7 In both cases the term is extremely broad and does not 
account for size.
Neither has academic terminology settled on a definition. Barzilai-Nahon’s 
‘Network Gatekeeper Theory’ introduced a new concept of internet gatekeepers 
controlling information, and the manner of that control.8 Much of the subsequent 
work on defining these and other internet services has been from a legal perspective, 
for example to identify liability. This was Emily Laidlaw’s focus in 2010. Laidlaw 
distinguished between ‘Internet gatekeepers, which are those gatekeepers that control 
the flow of information, and I[nternet] I[nformation]G[atekeeper]s, which as a result 
of this control, impact participation and deliberation in democratic culture’.9 This 
allows one to separate the Internet Service Providers, which simply provide access, 
from the Internet Information Gatekeepers, who structure, filter, prioritise and support 
the communication of information. 
More recently the term ‘digital intermediary’ has been used to define organisations 
like Google/Alphabet, Facebook, and Apple.10 Some policy-makers have also chosen 
to bypass industry definitions entirely and simply use the acronym GAFA for Google, 
Apple, Facebook and Amazon.11
This study prefers the term ‘information intermediary’, as used by Natali Helberger, 
since it distinguishes those that communicate information and knowledge – such as 
Google and Twitter – from those that provide an intermediating digital service where 
previously there were analog ones – such as Uber and AirBNB.12 This report does 
not focus on those who have indirect structural influence, such as Internet Service 
Providers.
None of the terms used to date are entirely sufficient. This is because the 
differences between these organisations and their services outnumber their similarities. 
Therefore though the study will refer to ‘information intermediaries’ it will also use 
terms like ‘tech giant’. These are intended as descriptors and are not used pejoratively. 
As will be shown in this study, it is indeed the size of these organisations, and their 
focus on technology, that distinguishes them from other organisations and industries.
In October 2015 Google created a parent company, Alphabet, to oversee its 
growing number of different companies and services. This study tends to use the 
names of the individual companies within Alphabet such as Google, YouTube, 
and Android or will refer to Alphabet/Google, since the new name is still relatively 
unfamiliar to many.
2 | How big are they?
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7In 1888 the American journalist and author Edward Bellamy wrote a book 
called Looking Backward: 2000-1887. This bestselling novel predicted that the 
consolidation of industry would continue until eventually, by the year 2000, 
society would be transformed into one great organization. The book, intended as 
a utopian vision, was published as the phenomenon of the US Trusts was starting 
to generate public and political alarm.
Bellamy may have been a few years awry when it comes to the digital world, and it 
may be a handful of companies rather than one, but as predictions go, Bellamy’s was 
more accurate than most.
The top three most valuable brands in the world in 2015, according to the 
Forbes ranking, were Apple, Microsoft and Google.13 Facebook was tenth, Amazon 
thirteenth. The scale and reach of these companies is now calculated in billions 
of people rather than millions, and many of us are dependent upon their services, 
whether we choose to be or not.
In 2013 a dystopian novel, The Circle written by Dave Eggers, described an 
Orwellian world dominated by a ‘Google-like, Facebook-like tech behemoth’.14 
Unlike Bellamy’s novel, Eggers’ is based in the near – not the distant – future.
Finding the numbers
Discovering the scale, reach and activities of these tech companies is not an entirely 
straightforward exercise. There are three main reasons for this. The first is that the 
companies themselves, while being transparent about certain information, keep many 
details private. One can learn, for example, about the Halloween costumes that are 
trending by US location based on search data at Google Frightgeist, but not how 
many searches are done each day on the search engine. The second reason is that 
most industry measurements tools are commercial and, though they provide some 
data publicly, keep much of it for their clients. The third reason is that the companies’ 
activities change so frequently, and their users rise – and occasionally fall – so fast, 
that establishing firm figures is like playing Whac-A-Mole.
All the major tech companies – Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, 
Twitter, LinkedIn – are listed and therefore required to make certain information 
public. Most choose not to release much corporate information beyond this. Google, 
for example, ‘is notorious for not regularly sharing’ figures such as number of searches, 
according to Danny Sullivan of Search Engine Land.15 Facebook is even less open 
with its usage data, though it commissions research, some of which it releases.
Digging through the various communications of the companies themselves does, 
however, provide a good deal of information. Mark Zuckerberg publishes facts and 
figures on his Facebook page, as do some of his colleagues like WhatsApp’s Jan Koum. 
Google has an official blog, and there are blogs on other Alphabet services (Alphabet 
itself did not have its own blog in 2015). Twitter provides basic information on its site, 
and tweets company news.
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8For usage statistics one can use commercial companies that base their figures on 
large national and global samples. Comscore collects usage through its sample of users 
in 172 countries worldwide (comscore.com). Statista, a fast-growing Hamburg-based 
organisation, collects data on over 80,000 topics from over 18,000 sources, and had 
600,000 registered users in 2015 (according to statista.com). Though they make some 
data publicly available, however, much of it is only available to clients. This study uses 
publicly available information from these and other sources.
Tech industry news sites have mushroomed in the last decade. Those reporting 
regularly on the activities of the tech companies include Vox Media owned Re/Code 
and The Verge, plus TechCrunch, TheNextWeb, Search Engine Land, Business 
Insider, VentureBeat, and Quartz. Although these do not focus exclusively on the 
major players, these take up a good deal of their attention.
Although there is a growing body of academic research on the uses of these digital 
services – particularly ones like Twitter – there is little academic research on the scale 
and size of these organisations. This is not surprising. These organisations are young 
and are changing so fast that they elude lengthy academic time frames. This may 
change as the companies age.
Whatever figures one uses will, inevitably, be out of date as soon as they are 
put down on paper. As is set out in this study, the speed of growth of some of 
these services is difficult to comprehend. From August 2014 to September 2015 
WhatsApp added more users than the populations of Germany, France, Italy and 
the UK combined (growing by 300 million – Statista, 2015). Any assessment of size 
necessarily therefore has to be a snapshot. This study is a snapshot taken in 2015, just 
over twenty-five years after the invention of the world wide web.
The risk of taking such a snapshot is that, by the time it is read, circumstances 
may have changed substantially. All the organisations in this report will have grown 
or shrunk. A new digital organisation could have risen to global prominence. Yet, 
unless the structure of the digital world has changed fundamentally, there will still be a 
handful of tech giants providing services for a large proportion of the world’s citizens, 
and the dilemmas described here will remain the same.
9Scale and Reach
By the end of 2015 there were just over three billion people in the world who use the 
internet.16 1.49 billion, or almost half of them were active Facebook users in 2015.17 
Facebook had almost as many active users as there are Muslims in the world.18 This 
despite Facebook being banned in China and disrupted in numerous other countries. 
On a single Monday in August 2015, Facebook reported that, for the first time, over a 
billion people used its service.19
These figures do not account for Facebook’s other services. WhatsApp, the 
messaging service it bought for $19 billion in 2014, had more than 900 million active 
users in September 2015.20 In India alone WhatsApp was used by almost fifty million 
people in 2014.21 Facebook Messenger, a similar messaging service to WhatsApp, and 
available separately from Facebook, had 700 million users globally by mid-2015.22 
Instagram, the photo sharing website had 400 million monthly users by September 
2015.23
1.2 billion people regularly use Google to search for information.24 These 1.2 billion 
people make, on average, about three billion searches a day, over 100 billion searches 
a month.25 26 Alphabet’s video platform, YouTube, is similarly popular. In 2013 it 
exceeded over 1 billion users each month, from its inception in 2005.27 In this brief 
ten-year history its users have uploaded more than 135 million ‘how-to’ videos and 
10 million cat videos.28 Android, Alphabet’s mobile phone operating platform, boasts 
over one billion users worldwide, as well as 4,000 unique Android devices available to 
buy.29
800 million people have an Apple iTunes account; greater than the total population 
of Europe.30 In the first quarter of 2015 Apple was selling over 550 iPhones each 
minute, as compared to about 256 babies born in the world each minute.31 32
244 million people have bought something from Amazon in the last twelve 
months.33 Amazon has over eight times as many books in stock than the uppermost 
estimates of the total number of scrolls in the great library of Alexandria at its peak 
(3.4 million books vs 400,000 scrolls).
500 million tweets are published each day, by Twitter’s 320 million active Twitter 
users.34 ‘About a billion’ people were registered on Twitter in 2013.35 LinkedIn grew 
from under a hundred million users in 2010 to just under 400 million in 2015.36
Even in a world in which we are daily bombarded with big numbers, these are of an 
entirely different magnitude to those associated with most commercial organisations.
Hard to Avoid
Few people with an internet connection outside China can now get through each day 
without using the products and services of these global US technology companies. 
If someone has not used Google search, or Apple iTunes, or bought something from 
Amazon, there is still a good chance they will have used Google’s Android operating 
system or Apple’s iOS on their mobile search. Or if they went on the web at all 
it is likely they will have done it with the help of Chrome (Google/Alphabet), or 
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Safari (Apple). Or perhaps they sent an email via gmail (Google/Alphabet), Hotmail 
(Microsoft), or icloud (Apple). Or an instant message via WhatsApp (Facebook), or 
Facebook Messenger (Facebook). Or posted a photograph on Instagram (Facebook). 
Or viewed a video on YouTube (Google/Alphabet). Or chatted to a family member 
across the globe using Skype (Microsoft).
In Norway over three-quarters of internet users are active Facebook users, or just 
over 60 per cent of the total population of Norway.37 In Brazil Google has a 97 per 
cent share of search.38 Skype accounted for 40 per cent of the entire conventional 
international telecom market in 2014.39
Even those who consciously try to avoid using these services find it increasingly 
hard. A person may keep a private email account, but as soon as they engage with 
someone with a free account such as gmail, the contents of that exchange will be held 
by the corporation.40 Since 2014 Facebook has tracked the web movements of its 
users even when they are outside its network.41 ‘Like’ buttons track your movements 
online, as do Facebook’s ‘conversion pixels’, invisible text within a webpage.42 In 2012 
it had ‘more than 200 “trackers” watching our internet activity’.43 The Facebook 
phone app monitors the location of your phone.44 Apple also tracks your movements 
via your iPhone, though says the information only ever remains on the hardware.45 In 
both cases you can disable the tracking.
Google collects data from you (your name, email address, telephone number, credit 
card), from your search history, your gmail, your voice search, your use of YouTube, 
Chrome, and information from Google+ and Android. Google can also track your 
movements via your phone.46 47 From 2012 it combined about 70 privacy policies so 
it could analyse the aggregate data.48 Google’s Android operating system was used by 
eight of the ten smart phones sold internationally in 2014, and is now being integrated 
to smart homes and cars, according to Google’s Sundar Pichai.49
Julia Angwin, a journalist at ProPublica, detailed her attempts to hide her digital 
trail in her 2014 book Dragnet Nation. Despite lengthy and exhausting efforts she 
eventually found she was unable to become digitally invisible without entirely 
disengaging from the modern world.50 As the chief executive of Google, Larry Page, 
accurately pointed out, ‘We build products you can’t live without’.51
These global technology giants now bestride our world like Colossi. We wake to 
their alarms. We sleep to the continual ping of messages arriving on their hardware 
and via their software. They have become integral to our communication, to our 
access to news and information, to our virtual identities.
In Data and Goliath, Bruce Schneier writes that each of us is now forced to ‘pledge 
our allegiance’ to one or other of these ‘feudal lords’ – Google, Apple, Microsoft, 
Facebook – and even if we want to remain independent ‘it’s becoming increasingly 
difficult to avoid pledging allegiance to at least one of them’.52
Nor is it just individual reliance. Public authorities are using these tools for public 
purposes. The town of Jun, in Spain, started using Twitter from 2011 as the ‘principal 
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medium for citizen-government communication’.53 This included not only tweeting 
public information and publicizing events, but also for police alerts and dialogue 
with the mayor’s office. In the UK Cambridgeshire police announced they would 
be speaking to some victims of crime via Skype, as part of a trial to make the service 
more efficient.54 The British Prime Minister tweeted his shock at the terrorist attacks 
in France in November 2015.55
Reaping the rewards
Our growing reliance on these organisations has helped make them very highly 
valued. Apple became the first US company to achieve a valuation of over $700 
billion in February 2015 (dropping later in the year). In addition to its high profit 
margins Apple had built up a cash surplus of $178 billion, ‘the biggest of any public 
corporation in the world’.56 Alphabet’s market capitalization reached almost $530 
billion by the end of 2015, making it more valuable that the oil giant Exxon Mobile. 
In 2014 Google (as then was) made $14.4 billion in profit. Microsoft was not that far 
behind Alphabet at a valuation of over $440 billion at the close of 2015. Facebook 
was valued at nearly $300 billion by the end of that year.57 
These technology and media companies are not just large compared to their 
industry contemporaries, but also compared to the nineteenth century US Trusts at 
whom the Sherman Act was aimed. When Standard Oil was at its height just after 
the turn of the twentieth century it was making profits of approximately $65 million 
a year.58 This equates to around $1.7 billion in 2015. In 2014 Apple made a profit of 
over $39 billion, or more than twenty times that of Standard Oil when it attracted the 
attention of US antitrust legislators.
The wealth of these organisations allows them to invest significant amounts in 
research and development, as well as acquiring companies that complement or 
compete with their services. Facebook paid $19 billion for the messaging service 
WhatsApp in 2014.59 Google made more than 170 acquisitions between 1998 and 
2015, many of which it integrated with its own services – such as YouTube, Adsense, 
Blogger, Picasa, Analytics.60
Extending their reach
Dauda Musa runs a mobile money transfer business in Accra, Ghana, and will, 
according to Mark Zuckerberg, benefit from Facebook’s internet.org.61 Facebook’s 
chief executive also points to the benefits of internet.org to school children in 
Chandauli, a small village in northern India62 and a driver in Manila ‘who uses 
Facebook and the internet to stay in touch with loved ones who moved to Dubai’.63
Zuckerberg’s refences to non-western countries are unlikely to have been 
accidental. Facebook was, by late 2015, claiming to provide internet access to 
millions across the developed world via ‘Free Basics’ or internet.org. The service, 
a partnership between Facebook and local telecoms providers launched in August 
2013, gives people low cost internet access via their mobile phones. Facebook’s aim is 
to help provide access to the internet to the four billion people who are currently not 
connected.
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In the first half of 2015 Facebook made internet.org available across Tamil Nadu, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala and Telangana in India, in Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Panama, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Ghana. This is in addition 
to Columbia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.64 The ambition, Facebook said, was to 
make internet.org available in 100 countries by the end of 2015.65 Facebook was able 
to extend its reach by partnering with local telephone companies like the Reliance 
network in India, and Airtel in Ghana.
Google and Facebook’s ambitions have also led them into the air to help people 
connect to the internet and their services. Facebook has invested in a solar airplane 
project. It has built planes wider than Boeing 737s but light enough to glide at 60,000 
feet for months on end, which can beam the internet down to groundstations by 
laser.66
Google hatched similar plans, except with balloons rather than planes. Project 
Loon, like Facebook’s unmanned aircraft, aimed to provide internet access for those 
in remote areas or with poor access to good digital infrastructure (google.com/loon, 
2015). The balloons float in the stratosphere, 20km above the earth, controlled by 
automated algorithms. ‘We’re getting to the point where we can roll out thousands of 
balloons’ Mike Cassidy, the project lead, said in a Google video in April 2015.67
These ventures take the tech giants into new territory as regards national and 
international law. So new are some of the dilemmas with respect to regulation that 
Facebook and Google started collaborating to try to change the law to make it easier 
to use aircraft in the stratosphere to provide internet access.68
Barely teenagers
When contemplating the scale and reach of these internet giants it is easy to forget 
quite how young they are. Google was incorporated on September 7th, 1998.69 
TheFacebook.com (as it was then called), went live on Wednesday February 4th, 
200470 and was established as a limited liability company in April the same year. The 
first ever official tweet was posted on March 21st, 2006 – ‘just setting up my twttr’ 
posted Jack Dorsey.71 Amazon.com is, by comparison, mature. Jeff Bezos registered 
the URL Amazon.com on November 1, 1994.72 Apple is, relatively speaking, the 
granddaddy, having been founded in 1976 (though its renaissance is normally linked 
to the return of Steve Jobs in 1997).
As they have grown they have also changed and continue to change – sprouting 
new services, adopting new ambitions and assuming new names. Google became 
Alphabet in October 2015, as a way in which to restructure the multiplying Google 
businesses beyond search. David Kirkpatrick subtitled later editions of his biography 
of Facebook, ‘the world’s fastest growing company’.
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Monopolies and Oligopolies
The tech giants are not only young, and big, they hold dominant positions across 
many digital markets. Google has more than a 90 per cent share of general search in 
most European countries,73 a market in which Google has held a dominant position 
for many years.74 In the US its market share for general search is lower, at 64 per cent, 
though this is still considered dominant in European terms.75 Google’s dominance of 
mobile search in Europe is even greater, at 96 per cent: in the US this stands at 91 
per cent.76 Internationally, 89 per cent of general searches were made using Google in 
mid-2015.77
Android, the mobile phone operating system developed by Google, had 
also become the dominant system worldwide by 2015. Over 80 per cent of the 
smartphones sold globally in mid-2015 ran on the Android operating system.78 When 
combined with the sale of phones with Apple’s iOS mobile operating system together 
their share adds up to 97 per cent.79
In video YouTube had a 56 per cent share of the worldwide ‘desktop video 
viewing’ market. Together with Facebook video, with 33 per cent share, the two had 
89 per cent of the market.80 In ebooks, in the UK, Amazon had a 95 per cent share 
of the e-book market in 2015.81 Its share was lower in the US, though still dominant, 
estimated at 65 per cent.82 In social media, Facebook had, by the end of 2014, a 61 
per cent share of social logins, with Google+ on 22 per cent.83 Five of the top ten most 
used mobile apps in the US and UK over the course of 2015 were made by Google or 
Facebook.84
Citing three studies in Africa and Asia, Quartz news suggested that, for some 
internet users at least, Facebook is the internet.85 Two of the studies were in Indonesia 
and Africa in 2012 and the third, commissioned by Quartz, was in Nigeria and 
Indonesia in 2014. All three were, as Quartz acknowledges, of limited scale. Though 
others have encountered similar confusion between Facebook and the internet. Sheryl 
Sandberg, Facebook’s Chief Operating Office in 2015, told the Wall Street Journal 
that ‘People actually confuse Facebook and the internet in some places’.86 Vlad Savov, 
writing in The Verge, argued that Facebook was ‘gradually starting to eat the web up’ 
and replacing the open web with a ‘Facebook-approved version’.87
From this it may seem ‘rather obvious that many very successful Internet-based 
companies are nearly monopolists’.88 Indeed, observers have asked whether these 
services should be considered ‘essential facilities’,89 ‘natural monopolies’,90 or 
‘common carriers’.91 Zuckerberg himself, and other founders of Facebook, talked 
about wanting Facebook to be a ‘social utility’, according to David Kirkpatrick.92
However, assertions that these organisations and their services are monopolies are 
disputed, not least by those within the companies themselves. ‘While Google may be 
the most used search engine,’ Amit Singhal, Senior Vice President at Google Search 
posted in April 2015, ‘people can now find and access information in numerous 
different ways… In fact, people have more choice than ever before’.93 To support this 
claim Singhal argued that there were ‘numerous other search engines such as Bing, 
Yahoo, Quora, DuckDuckGo and a new wave of search assistants like Apple’s Siri and 
Microsoft’s Cortana’. In addition to which there were specialised search services (for 
example within Amazon), and social search (for example via Facebook). 
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Others have taken issue with the categorisation of these services as essential 
facilities, natural monopolies or common carriers on the basis that commercially viable 
competitors are available, online markets change quickly, and their services are not 
essential to society.94
Drawing a line around the market in which they compete is also perilously tricky. 
Google views eBay, Expedia and Amazon as competitors to its specialised searches.95 
Rather than classify Google as general search, it could be classified as consumer tech, 
or digital advertising.96 In both these markets it would have a far smaller market share. 
Ironically, the larger some of these intermediaries become and the more markets they 
participate in, the more difficult it will be to call them monopolies.
Even amongst those who accept that these companies are dominant, or in some 
cases virtual monopolies, there are those who dispute that this is a problem. Indeed 
Peter Thiel, one of the co-founders of PayPal and Palantir, has argued the opposite, 
claiming that monopoly can allow a company like Google to be creative, and that 
competition would distract from this creativity. ‘Creative monopolies’ Thiel writes, 
‘aren’t just good for the rest of society; they’re powerful engines for making it better’.97
Are digital monopolies different?
Even should one accept that these organisations are monopolists or oligopolists in 
certain markets, there is the question of whether they are different from traditional, 
non-digital monopolies, and should therefore be dealt with differently. There are, for 
example, at least three ways in which it may be argued digital monopolies are distinct 
from their analog equivalents: pricing, network effect, and choice.
In 2002 Jean Tirole and Jean-Charles Rochet published a paper whose influence is 
still being felt. ‘Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets’ showed why it might be 
logical for platforms – or intermediaries – to make their services free to the public at 
the point of use.98
Two-sided markets, they wrote, ‘often treat one side as a profit center and the other 
as a loss leader, or, at best, as financially neutral’. A credit card company, for example, 
needs cardholders and it needs affiliated merchants. It therefore might charge 
cardholders very little in order to attract more merchants. Similarly, it can be logical 
for information intermediaries to structure their pricing to subsidise one side of the 
market in order to incentivize the other. Devising a pricing structure to ‘get both sides 
on board’ can therefore make sense.99 This is indeed what most of the information 
intermediaries have done. Facebook, Google, Twitter and others do not charge users 
for their services in order to grow their user base to a size where it becomes more 
attractive to other users and to advertisers.
Making their services free to the public at the point of use differentiates these 
organisations from traditional monopolies and may mollify certain traditional 
concerns about them. Classical economic concerns about monopolies centre on 
monopolist’s ability to control prices. Once in control of the market, the monopoly 
provider can charge the customer a higher price, and the customer is unable to go 
elsewhere for a comparable service. ‘The price of monopoly’ Adam Smith wrote, ‘is 
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upon every occasion the highest which can be got… The price of free competition, on 
the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken’.100 Yet, if the dominant provider is not 
charging anything for the service, it is difficult to argue that the concern still holds or 
that the provider is misusing its position of dominance.
Google made this argument in response to the European Commission’s antitrust 
charges against it. ‘The statement of objections [served by the Commission] fails 
to take proper account of the fact that search is provided for free’ Google wrote, 
‘A finding of abuse of dominance requires a ‘trading relationship’ as confirmed by 
consistent case law. No trading relationship exists between Google and its users’.101 
The lack of a trading relationship also makes it very difficult for a user, or a regulator, 
to establish the value of the exchange.
Digital monopolies may also differ from traditional monopolies, particularly natural 
monopolies, with respect to the network effect. Natural monopolies are ‘those which 
are created by circumstances, and not by law’, such as water, railways, and fixed line 
telephones.102 They generally require initial infrastructural investment, investment that 
is then offset by the subsequent benefits of the network effect. For users, the network 
effect means that the service becomes more useful and effective the more people use 
it.
The information intermediaries are reliant on, and the beneficiaries of, the network 
effect. Facebook would be a far less useful service if fewer people used it. Yet, in the 
case of the information intermediaries, the network effect is different to previous 
network effects – such as the telephone or railways – in terms of its speed and spread 
of adoption. It took 64 years for the telephone to reach 40 per cent penetration in 
the US, but only three and a half years for social media to reach 50 per cent.103 104 In 
this sense it might be more appropriate to call it a ‘sheer’ network effect, given the 
steepness of its take-up.
The same factors that allow for an upward sheer network effect could, theoretically, 
work in the opposite direction. In other words, digital intermediaries could decline 
at a similar speed to that which they grow. This, again, is different than traditional 
network monopolies whose investment in the infrastructure of the network can act as 
a barrier to entry for other providers and as a disincentive for people who may want 
to leave. The cost of building railroads and investing in trains, for example, acts as a 
barrier to potential competition. By contrast, the infrastructure of the net is already in 
place. Similarly, there is a cost, to a train user, associated with switching from using 
train travel to an alternative mode of transport. By comparison, the cost of switching 
from one online service to another may be much lower.
This leads to a third difference between digital monopolies and traditional ones. 
Monopolies, it has traditionally been argued, reduce consumer choice. When Henry 
Ford dominated the US car market in the early twentieth he famously quipped 
that ‘Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is 
black’.105 Yet digital monopolies have been successful partly because they help enable 
consumer choice. Google search is successful because many people believe it is the 
most effective way to navigate information and help them filter an over-abundance of 
choice.
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Partly for these three reasons – pricing, network effect, and choice – commentators 
have seen these tech giants as different from their analog equivalents. ‘[H]igh 
market concentration levels cannot simply be interpreted in the same manner as in 
conventional markets without network effects’.106 Some also accept that in some 
of these markets, monopolies or oligopolies may be almost inevitable. ‘It is well-
known in the literature that an equilibrium can sustain only a small number of such 
intermediaries and a concentrated market structure is thus expected’.107 There is also a 
growing acknowledgment that in certain digital markets, for better or worse, there will 
be one, or a small number, of dominant providers. As Jaron Lanier and Andrew Keen 
note, this means that in some digital markets, it is highly likely that ‘winner-takes-
all’.108 109
This does not, of course, address the personal, the political or the civic questions 
that are raised by the scale and dominance of these companies and their services, 
questions that this study seeks partly to address. Nor does it answer the complex 
economic questions about how the differences between digital and traditional 
monopolies play out. We do not, for example, know how the collection and use of 
personal data may give an information intermediary an unfair competitive advantage 
in other commercial sectors. To what extent does Google or Apple’s knowledge of 
our movements give them an unfair advantage if they decide to develop cars or new 
transport systems?
Disputes over how we classify the tech giants and how we express their dominance 
are not just semantic. Were Facebook to be defined as a utility, or Google search a 
natural monopoly, it would raise immediate public interest questions, and amplify calls 
for the regulation of these services that these companies are keen to avoid.
If one does conclude that it is appropriate to consider some of these services 
‘natural monopolies’ then that necessarily raises the question of how one ensures that 
they do not misuse their monopoly power, and how the benefits they gain from their 
monopoly services (particularly, in this case, in terms of personal data) can be shared 
such that they do not solely benefit other services offered by the same provider.
Yet whether or not there is consensus about how these organisations be defined, 
it is clear that, in the last two decades, a handful of US companies have helped to 
create new digital markets and have come to lead those markets, sometimes as virtual 
monopolies, sometimes as oligopolies. It is not clear whether they will maintain their 
lead or their dominance or whether the sheer network effect will, for one or more of 
them, work in the opposite direction.
However, by 2015, they had consolidated their global positions to such a degree as 
to make it increasingly difficult for smaller players or new entrants to challenge them. 
Competition in some of the markets in which they operate may have been ‘just a click 
away’ a decade ago, but the barriers to entry for new rivals had become very high 
indeed.
Customers’ expectations of fast download speeds and quick response time is, for 
example, such that it requires significant data processing power. This in turn means 
large infrastructural investment in order to be competitive. As an illustration, in 2013 
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Facebook opened a new data centre in Lulea, Sweden. The centre is ‘the size of four 
football fields’ at over 30,000 sq m, houses thousands of servers and has, according 
to one newspaper, ‘a hint of the movie Bladerunner’.110 It is located within the arctic 
circle to take advantage of local hydroelectric power and in order to cool the plant 
naturally. When it opened Lulea, Facebook already had four such centres in the US. 
The company, like other information intermediaries, did not release the cost of a data 
centre, but Gigaom estimated upwards of $300 million.111 This level of infrastructural 
investment would be prohibitive to all but the largest corporate start-ups or 
governments. It makes it highly unlikely that the tech giants’ dominant positions will 
be challenged by market mechanisms alone.
This puts these organisations in positions of significant power. This power has also 
allowed them to dream up ambitions and aspirations that are, in some cases, literally 
out of this world.
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Ambitions and Aspirations
“It’s a little like a spaceship” Steve Jobs said in 2011 of Apple’s plans for a new, $5bn 
building in Cupertino. It was one of the last announcements Jobs would make before 
he died later that year. Yet the futuristic plan for Apple’s new offices continued 
and was set to open in 2016.112 Designed by Norman Foster’s company, the same 
company that built the new Reichstag in Berlin and the translucent tent in Astana, 
Kazakhstan, Apple’s headquarters was to resemble a huge glass donut. More than 
a mile all round, it would be filled inside and out with foliage (Apple employed a 
senior arborist to oversee trees). When asked if Apple might include a museum in its 
lavish new Cupertino campus, its senior VP of worldwide marketing replied “We are 
focused on inventing the future, not celebrating the past”.113
Not to be outdone Google announced, in 2015, plans to build a space-age campus, 
comprising small villages within huge see-through canopies, that will ‘include self-
driving cars, solar-powered drones and robots’.114 The Guardian called it ‘a pastoral 
utopia-with-WiFi’.115
Facebook too built a new campus in 2014-2015 in Menlo Park, designed by Frank 
Gehry, the architect behind the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. The new office 
contained the ‘the largest open floor plan in the world’ that fit 2,800 people, and a 
9-acre roof top park with walking trails.116 The building was designed to reflect the 
open-ness and transparency of Facebook culture.
Close to the campus Facebook acquired a 200-acre waterside plot with plans to 
develop a small municipality for Facebook employees. Dubbed ‘Zee-town’ (after 
Zuckerberg), Facebook reportedly planned to build apartments, houses, hotels and 
shops on the space, similar to the industry towns built for steelworkers, stonemasons or 
factory workers in the nineteenth century (by Andrew Carnegie in MacDonald, Ohio, 
for example).
Amazon’s building plans in 2015 were not quite as ambitious as the other tech 
giants, but still included large transparent biospheres in downtown Seattle, described 
in one report as an ‘Elysian utopia’.117 Unlike some of his tech contemporaries, 
however, Amazon’s founder Jeff Bezos was also reported to have plans to colonise 
space, and succeeded in launching a first test flight in April 2015.118119 It is not known 
if he has any plans for office space on other planets.
These building plans, innovative and ambitious in their own right, reflect the much 
broader aspirations and ambitions of the companies that commission them. For many 
years these companies have been described as building the future. Ken Auletta’s 
biography of Google, ‘Googled’, is subtitled ‘The End of the World as We Know 
It’. In Jeff Jarvis’ book – What Would Google Do? Google is used as a model for doing 
everything from publishing to building cars to running governments. Historian Yuval 
Harari, writing in the New Statesman, went as far as to call the Silicon Valley leaders 
‘the Lenins of our time’, indeed ‘when it comes to audacity and scope,’ Harari writes 
‘even Lenin couldn’t hold a candle to the silicon prophets’.120 
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Alphabet/Google famously encourages its employees to come up with ‘moon-
shots’ – ideas that are unique and wildly ambitious. It has a semi-secret lab 
called Google X, from which self-driving cars was developed (run by ‘Captain of 
Moonshots’). It employed the futurist Ray Kurzweil as director of engineering and 
‘an immortality true-believer’ – Bill Maris to invest in ventures to extend life.121 It has 
established or bought companies like Calico who are ‘tackling aging’ (from calicolabs.
com), DeepMind who aim to ‘Solve Intelligence’ (from deepmind.com) and Magic 
Leap, who claim ‘It’s time to bring magic back into the world’ (from magicleap.com). 
We are told we are living through ‘the Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube’.122 
Yet we are also told we are in ‘the age of Amazon’,123 and ‘the age of Google’.124
Follow the Leaders
It is helpful, when trying to better understand these company’s ambitions, to listen 
to the founders themselves, given how central they are to their company’s goals. The 
way they express these goals is, for the most part, not corporate and commercial, but 
in terms of a social, even utopian, mission.
‘He is, at heart, a passionate utopian’ Nicholas Carlson wrote of Google Chief 
Executive Larry Page in 2014.125 This is reflected in Page’s talks at the annual Google 
developer events, the Google I/O. ‘I think we’re all here because we share a deep 
sense of optimism about the potential of technology to improve people’s lives, and 
the world’ Page said at the event in 2013.126 Page’s business partner Sergey Brin is 
similarly messianic about technology, though more focused (in his public statements 
at least). “We want Google to be the third half of your brain.” Brin said. For him 
this means using technology to enable an individual to access global intelligence: 
“Ultimately you want to have the entire world’s knowledge connected directly to 
your mind”.127 “It quickly became apparent that Sergey Brin and Larry Page saw 
themselves as missionaries”, Ken Auletta writes early in his book ‘Googled’. 128
Their executive Chairman, Eric Schmidt, believes that ‘Technology-driven change 
is inevitable’, and that issues such as ‘citizenship, statecraft, privacy and war’ will be 
‘driven by the rise of global connectivity’. Schmidt, writing with Jared Cohen, is not 
entirely sanguine about the direction of the world, but is sure its direction is within 
our control based on how humans ‘interact with, implement, adapt to and exploit 
technologies in their environment’.129
“Facebook was not originally created to be a company’ Mark Zuckerberg wrote 
in 2012, ‘It was built to accomplish a social mission - to make the world more 
open and connected’.130 Achieving this goal is central to Zuckerberg’s ambition for 
Facebook. Connectivity, Zuckerberg has written, is a ‘human right’,131 and Facebook, 
Zuckerberg suggests, can help make that right a reality, not for commercial reasons, 
but for social ones. 
20
Zuckerberg, Page and other heads of these big Silicon Valley companies, frequently 
talk about their mission to be a force for good in the world and to change the world 
for the better. Following the birth of his daughter Zuckerberg even pledged to 
donate 99 per cent of his shares in Facebook to ‘advancing human potential and 
promoting equality’.132 In this sense they do not simply want their organisations to be 
economically successful. They want them to be forces for social and political change 
as well.
Occasionally they express frustration at laws or regulations which temper their 
ambitions. At the Google I/O in 2013 Larry Page criticized laws made in a pre-
internet era:
“If you look at the different kinds of laws we make, they’re very old. The laws 
when we went public were 50 years old. A law can’t be right if it’s 50 years old, 
like it’s before the Internet, that’s a pretty major change, in how you may go 
public.”133
Page imagined a space where people at organisations like Google could experiment, 
without legal or regulatory restraints:
“I think as technologists we should have some safe places where we can try out 
some new things and figure out what is the effect on society, what’s the effect on 
people, without having to deploy kind of into the normal world.”134
This frustration with old laws and regulations may help explain the various 
experiments with drones, balloons and satellites. The tech giants are looking to 
colonise uncharted spaces. Similarly, the construction of a self-sufficient town – Zee 
Town – may provide not just homes for workers, but a space free from normal civic 
constraints and responsibilities. Writing about Facebook’s municipal plans Adam 
Greenfield was struck by ‘ how clearly it reflects the tech industry’s continuing 
withdrawal from the public realm’.135
The aspiration of these companies to withdraw from the public realm, and to find 
spaces unfettered by legal restraint suggests a limited commitment to civic duty, or at 
least to civic duty as currently framed. Yet though these companies may want to free 
themselves of civic constraints, their services now play increasingly important civic 
roles. The next section sets out these roles, and the power associated with them, and 
shows why it is inevitable that democratic societies will respond.
3 | Civic power
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‘Modern technology platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple, 
are even more powerful than most people realize, and our future world will be 
profoundly altered by their adoption and successfulness in societies everywhere’ 
Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age (2013) 136
The Executive Chairman of Alphabet’s assertion that the large tech companies 
will profoundly alter our future world, though expressed in grandiose and 
deterministic language, justifiably points to their importance beyond the purely 
economic. When people talk about the power of the tech giants they often focus 
on their economic power and their dominance of particular markets. Though 
this is clearly important, to concentrate on it can obscure their significant, 
and growing, civic power. It is their civic power that distinguishes them from 
other large transnational corporations and that gives their size, dominance and 
ambitions such political and social implications.
As Rebecca MacKinnon wrote, these and other internet companies are ‘even more 
powerful because not only do they create and sell products, but they also provide and 
shape the digital spaces upon which citizens increasingly depend’.137
Back in 2007 the academic Bill Dutton spoke about an emergent ‘Fifth Estate’ 
made possible by the internet. Ten years on and this Fifth Estate continues to emerge 
although significant control of, and responsibility for, its emergence has fallen – by 
default and design – to a handful of tech giants.
Some of the civic power they are gaining is comparable to, indeed is starting to take 
over from, the power of traditional media organizations. The power, for example, to 
command public attention, the power to communicate news and information, or the 
power to give people a voice. Other civic powers are supplementary to, and distinct 
from, those of traditional media, such as enabling collective action, and the role they 
play in elections.
The tech companies prefer not to view themselves as powerful, but rather point to 
how their tools and services empower the public. The ‘most significant impact of the 
spread of communication technologies’ Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen write, ‘will be 
the way in which they help reallocate the concentration of power away from states 
and institutions and transfer it to individuals’.138
Similarly, Mark Zuckerberg talks about how ‘It’s been amazing to see how all of 
you [Facebook users] have used our tools to build a real community’. Today, he wrote 
in 2014, these tools have been used mostly for ‘sharing moments’ but in the next 
decade ‘they’ll also help you answer questions and solve complex problems’. Rather 
than claim credit or ascribe power to Facebook itself, Zuckerberg thanks his users 
for allowing him to help them: ‘I’m so grateful to be able to help build these tools for 
you’.139 For this reason it was perhaps not so surprising that he should have chosen, as 
his first book club book, Moses Naim’s The End of Power. Naim argues that power has 
dissipated from authority and is being divested to the people, particularly through new 
media tools.140
3 | Civic Power
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Yet the two are not mutually exclusive. Providing the tools and the platforms is a 
power in itself, particularly if an organization holds that power to a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic degree. This dualism, where the empowerment of the public supports and 
enhances that of the tech organisations, connects with ongoing intellectual debates 
about the nature of power and how it is shifting.
To say that debates about power and its conceptualization are deep and have a long 
history would be an understatement. This study does not intend to step into these 
broader debates about the conceptualization of power. Rather it tries to identify the 
particular types of power that new digital media organisations are acquiring. To do 
this it takes its understanding of power from the seminal work by Steven Lukes. 141 
Notably, from Lukes’ explanation of the three dimensions of power and his thesis that 
power is as much about the creation and control of the environment in which choices 
are made, as about a person or institution actively directing another to comply. As 
Lukes writes:
‘A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, 
but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, and determining his 
very wants’ (Lukes, 2005: 27).
As this study will show, this is chiefly how the power of the information 
intermediaries is exercised. The services these intermediaries offer can influence, 
shape and help determine people’s wants, since these organisations now play a 
significant and growing role in the extent to which citizens acquire information, 
communicate with one another, relate to authorities, and represent themselves.
Yet, the issue is complicated since the digital tools provided by these intermediaries 
(and others) can empower the public to challenge authority. Manuel Castells has 
written at length about this, capturing the idea of a digitally enabled public in the 
term ‘counterpower’. In this sense the digital intermediaries conform to Castells’ 
description of the media more generally as ‘the space where power relationships are 
decided between competing political and social actors’ (Castells, 2009). However, 
in providing the public with these tools the digital intermediaries are gaining power 
themselves as a consequence. The acquisition of power by the public and by the 
tech companies is not contradictory but complementary. For this reason it may 
be necessary to extend Lukes’ third dimension of power to recognize that ‘media 
[interpreted as including digital media] might provide a site both for the exercise of 
and resistance to power’ (Freedman, 2014).
However, as this study argues, potential problems emerge from the disparity 
between the capacity of the tech giants and the capacity of the individual. An 
individual may be able to set up a campaign on Facebook, which any of Facebook’s 
1.5 billion active users can join. Whereas Facebook can enable or disable the 
campaign (and ones similar), can obscure it, or can promote it to a part or a whole of 
its global user base. In this way it has the power to influence, enhance or constrain the 
ability of a campaign or political movement to pursue its cause. A future leftist reform 
movement could therefore, Evgeny Morozov cautions, be ‘bereft of any requisite 
ability to deliver on its agenda, for all the platforms for communication ended up in 
the private hands of techno-monopolists and their lobbyists’.141 
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It is not surprising that neither the tech giants themselves nor democratic societies 
more widely, understand the nature of the intermediaries’ power yet. It took many 
years for democratic societies to understand and embrace a free press (and tensions 
and restrictions persist). Some of these corporate giants are barely a decade old.
But it is necessary and urgent that democratic societies better understand this 
power. Otherwise there is a risk that it is not used constructively or responsibly, 
that citizens do not have adequate protection from the use or misuse of this power, 
or that democratic governments respond to this power in ways that are regressive or 
even harmful to citizens. This power therefore needs to be studied, its sources and its 
outcomes understood, and responses to it considered and evaluated.
Identifying the newfound types of civic power these organisations exercise is a 
necessary first step to understanding the benefits and dangers inherent in that power 
to democratic societies. This study identifies six:
1. The power to command attention
2. The power to communicate news
3. The power to enable collective action
4. The power to give people a voice
5. The power to influence people’s vote
6. The power to hold power to account
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Civic power and the media
The idea that the media has an essential civic role has a long pedigree. Edmund 
Burke referred to the press as the ‘Fourth Estate’ in the Houses of Parliament 
in 1787.142 In the same year in the US, Thomas Jefferson argued that, given the 
government is supposed to represent the views of the people, the press are more 
central than even the government itself.143
The specific civic roles of the press (in its broadest sense) have been described, 
analysed and summarized many times, and though there is much disagreement as to 
their exact nature there appears to be some consensus as to at least three or four key 
elements. These are: as a source of information (particularly regarding topics of public 
interest); as a ‘watchdog’ that holds powerful individuals and institutions to account; 
as a platform, or public sphere, to enable debate amongst citizens; and as a channel 
through which diverse citizens and interests can express their views and concerns.144
In performing these roles the media has acquired powers, some formal, some 
informal. It has formal powers within the law (such as exemptions and subsidies), and 
informal powers that come from its scale, reach and authority.145
This study assesses the degree to which large information intermediaries are starting 
to perform civic functions previously associated with the Fourth Estate, at how they 
may be providing further civic functions not previously performed (or performed in a 
different way), and the power they are acquiring as a result.
Though there are not yet other studies that approach information intermediaries 
in quite this way, there are a growing number of studies on the use of information 
intermediaries’ services for political and social ends. There are, for example, many 
analyses of the use of Twitter and social media during elections or as a means of social 
protest.146
A smaller, but growing number of studies examine the particular effect of the 
information intermediaries themselves on politics. These focus on civic engagement 
and participation,147 electoral influence,148 internet governance,149 free speech150 
and access to news.151 A study commissioned by Facebook tested the filter bubble 
effect.152
Natali Helberger wrote a particularly useful study mapping the legal, social and 
economic issues provoked by information intermediaries in 2014. In this she identifies 
five concerns about the influence of information intermediaries on public opinion and 
media pluralism: direct editorial influences, indirect editorial influences (for example 
through prioritization and discoverability), indirect-structural influences (for example 
ISPs and network neutrality), influence on media markets (for example through direct 
competition with media companies), and ‘wider direct or indirect influences on user 
rights and democratic freedoms’.153
A number of attempts have been made to evolve and explain how plurality and 
diversity, as understood in the twentieth century, can be understood in the context of 
digital intermediaries in the 21st.154 Despite these, and their emphasis on the transition 
from a world of information scarcity to one of information abundance, plurality policy 
remains fixed on the model of access to number of sources.
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The filter bubble thesis, which suggests that the personalization of digital services 
is such that people may only be exposed to information that confirms their existing 
worldview, is generating its own library of research.155 Separately, there is increasing 
interest in the concept of ‘algorithmic accountability’, the idea that mechanisms 
are needed to assess the way algorithms – that underpin the services of digital 
intermediaries – work.156 There are also studies of the various tech giants themselves, 
particularly on their origins and the personalities behind them.157 
This study takes a broader view. Rather than focus on a specific aspect of 
political or social engagement or on a particular intermediary, it looks at the broader 
phenomenon of large, transnational communications corporations and the civic role 
they are beginning to play.
It does this because, in the same way that the press altered the nature of government 
and governance in the C18th, C19th and C20th, so digital will alter it in the C21st – 
and the intermediaries will be integral to those changes.
The assessment here is certainly not intended to be comprehensive. The 
information intermediaries will be performing many political and social functions 
beyond those described in this report. Those described here are those that have been 
identified by the author and that have direct civic implications. The report does not 
examine issues around security and privacy that are discussed extensively elsewhere.
Nor is the assessment intended to be more than an initial examination of such 
an enormous and emerging subject. It can only touch on areas – such as collective 
action – where far more research is needed to understand the effect information 
intermediaries and their services are having.
It is, however, intended to introduce the idea that these information intermediaries 
are starting to perform important civic roles, and acquiring civic power as a result, and 
provoke consideration about what the implications of this are for democratic societies, 
including how best they should respond.
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1. The Power to Command Attention
Traditional media organisations are accustomed to commanding attention. On 1 
Sunday February 2015 over 114 million people in the US saw the New England 
Patriots’ 28-24 victory over the Seattle Seahawks on NBC, a record number of 
viewers for the Superbowl.158 In May 2015 almost 9 million people in the UK 
watched Arsenal beat Aston Villa on BBC One in the FA Cup final.159 This ability 
to command the attention of millions of people – particularly at home – is central to 
these media organisations’ power, prestige and sustainability.
Yet these audiences are dwarfed by the attention commanded by the services of 
the information intermediaries. Facebook had 968 million daily active users in mid 
2015.160 The average user spends 46 minutes a day checking their Facebook profile.161 
Eight billion videos were viewed each day on Facebook in late 2015, up from three 
billion by the end of 2014.162
‘Every day,’ according to YouTube, ‘people watch hundreds of millions of hours 
on YouTube and generate billions of views’.163 The most recent YouTube statistic 
available, from 2012, claimed the site was receiving four billion views per day 
worldwide.164
Attention that used to be focused on traditional media channels and programmes 
is being transferred to the platforms of the intermediaries. Unlike traditional media 
like television, these information intermediaries can reach an individual rather than 
a household. They can also, thank to the mass adoption of smartphones, reach the 
individual in any place, at any time.
The tech giants argue they are not equivalent to traditional media organisations 
and should not be viewed in the same way. They are, they say, only platforms (see, 
for example, Tamiz vs Google)165 and they simply act as pathways to enable people to 
reach content. As platforms that provide access to other content, or ‘mere conduits’ as 
it is described, they gain legal protection they would not otherwise have, for example 
through section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (2000) in the US and 
through exemption from aspects of the European E-commerce directive. Moreover as 
platforms, they argue, they should not be considered responsible in the same way that 
traditional media publisher would be.
Yet their ability to command attention enables them to go beyond their stated role 
as conduits and to perform valuable civic functions. During the UK floods of 2014 
Facebook chose to direct people in areas affected by flooding to local volunteers.166 
After the Nepalese disaster Google re-opened its ‘Person Finder’ tool to help people 
find those injured, lost or killed in the disaster.167 Twitter has, for many years, been a 
critical source of news during natural disasters, a facility that was formalized through 
‘Twitter Alerts’ in 2013.168 In October 2014 Facebook launched ‘Safety Check’ 
as a way to help people alert loved ones they are all right, in the wake of natural 
disasters.169 In January 2015 Facebook launched ‘Amber Alerts’ to help people find 
missing children.170 
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Over 100 billion searches are done on Google each month.171 One in twenty of 
these searches, Google reports, are health-related.172 To help people with their health 
searches, Google started putting health information directly into search results.173
Similarly, in national elections the tech giants have often sought to play a 
constructive role. This has ranged from supplying technology to campaigns, providing 
election information and communications support, and hosting debates.174 The 
public can make political donations via Twitter.175 In a well-known experiment in 
2010 Facebook went further. In both the UK and US elections that year it added an 
‘I voted’ button to people’s profiles. According to subsequent research this directly 
motivated 60,000 voters to go to the polls in the US, and that in turn triggered 
340,000 extra votes.176 
Between elections these platforms enable dialogue between citizens and 
government. As the Google Public Policy Blog states: ‘From live streams of the State 
of the Union and legislative hearings, to explainer videos on important issues and 
Hangouts with constituents, YouTube has become an important platform where 
citizens engage with their governments and elected officials’.177
Evan Williams, co-founder of Twitter, hoped the micro-blogging platform would 
become one of the primary ways in which people communicated with public 
authorities: “I think Twitter will be a fundamental part of how people interact with 
their government,” Williams said in 2010. “I think it will be how you get personal, 
customised information from every entity you care about, from your local café to your 
government, from your politician to your friends and family”.178 
One can understand and applaud the way large information intermediaries have 
begun to play such an important part in communicating public interest information 
and providing civic help and support, though there is no question that their actions 
piggyback on their ability to command attention and go beyond those of ‘mere 
conduits’.
This is made clear by the few occasions information intermediaries have chosen 
to use their platforms to express their own political view. Google blacked out its logo 
in January 2012 in protest against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect 
IP act (PIPA). It also urged people to sign a petition against the bills.179 On 22nd May 
2015 Google’s homepage in Ireland told its users they should #VoteYes in the Irish 
referendum on gay marriage (the motion passed with a Yes vote of 62 per cent).
When the tech giants pursue a campaign, it gains attention and followers very 
quickly. A range of tech leaders joined together in 2013 to form a campaign to reform 
immigration law in the US. Mark Zuckerberg helped lead the campaign, with the 
support of Reid Hoffman, CEO of LinkedIn, Bill Gates of Microsoft, and Sean Parker. 
Its backers included Eric Schmidt of Google and Marissa Mayer of Yahoo. ‘In a 
matter of weeks, FWD.us went from a mere idea to a leading organization in the fight 
for comprehensive immigration reform’ the campaign website said (www.fwd.us).
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The use of their power to command attention to promote their own views and 
services takes large information intermediaries beyond neutral platforms, and can give 
them a political power comparable to that of a broadcaster. The difference being that, 
in many democracies, broadcasters are constrained in what they can broadcast and in 
the political views they themselves can express.
In Britain, and elsewhere, broadcasting was seen as too powerful a medium, and too 
open to political abuse, to be purely commercial.180 It was considered to be a ‘utility to 
be developed as a national service in the public interest’,181 and is regulated as a public 
service.
Deciding what should command attention
Even if they do not express their own political views via their services, the large 
information intermediaries have the power to help determine who or what should 
command attention. They can act, in other words, as a non-neutral ‘gatekeeper’, 
controlling the access to content and services. As gatekeepers, they can help define 
terms that include rights of access, prioritization, and terms of use.182
When internet.org first launched in India in February 2015, there were – in 
addition to Facebook – 37 websites and apps available via the service.183 People in 
India could access the services of these providers via their mobile phones for free. If 
they wanted to use other services they had to pay. How these particular services were 
initially chosen is not clear, though Facebook is the controller of internet.org.
Within two months of launch there was a major backlash. Small companies and 
start ups argued that internet.org breached the principle of net neutrality and would 
give companies within the internet.org walled garden a huge advantage over those 
outside. It would also make Facebook the gateway for many Indian citizens, capturing 
and tracking their personal data. “Internet.org isn’t increasing internet access,” small 
businessman Nikhil Pahwa told The Verge, “It’s increasing Facebook access”.184
Companies that had signed up to internet.org, such as Cleartrip, NDTV and 
the Times Group, said they would withdraw some or all of their content from the 
service.185 Zuckerberg himself stepped in and argued that ‘net neutrality is not in 
conflict with working to get more people connected’, a position that was strongly 
contested by others.186
Facebook opened up its walled garden to all applicants in India in May 2015, 
under certain terms and conditions. This did not mollify the critics who argued it 
still represented a ‘fundamental, permanent change in the way the internet works’, 
that it was a ‘privacy nightmare’, and that the prime beneficiary would still be 
Facebook.187 Facebook renamed the service Free Basics and continued to contest 
that some internet access was better than none. In February 2016 the Indian 
telecommunications regulator ruled that Free Basics’ differential pricing did breach 
net neutrality and would therefore, in effect, be banned in India.
All information intermediaries play a gatekeeper role to some degree. Apple, for 
example, makes decisions about what apps should be allowed on its iOS platform 
according to its own criteria.188 Google search determines what should be on the first 
page of search results. Amazon decides by what criteria its users should be able to 
navigate books.
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In some cases the intermediaries are determining what information should 
command attention. In others – such as Facebook’s Free Basics – the intermediary 
determines whether information should be accessible at all. Those who cannot afford 
more than Free Basics will, by definition, have less equal access.
Moving from platform to publisher
The power to command attention is also encouraging some of these companies to 
move from being intermediaries to become fully-fledged media companies. Google, 
Amazon, Apple and Facebook all invest in content creation. In 2012 Google spent 
$200 million on original content for YouTube.189 At the beginning of 2015 Amazon 
announced it planned to ‘to acquire, produce and release a dozen films a year’.190 
These investments are in addition to its television series, on which it said it spent 
$100 million in the third quarter of 2015 alone. Facebook has sought to mimic the 
YouTube model and share revenues with video producers.191
As the large information intermediaries began to acquire, produce and distribute 
content, increasing numbers of people have suggested the distinction between 
platform and publisher is becoming ‘obsolete’.192 By mid-2015, observers noted, it 
was becoming ever harder for information intermediaries to claim they were neutral 
conduits:
“It is no longer possible [for social platforms] to say ‘we are just a platform’,” 
said Emily Bell, director of the Tow Center at Columbia University. “It’s become 
impossible to sustain the argument that says we have no responsibility to people 
who upload content, and we have no responsibility to people who are affected by 
it”193
At the very least, now that these information intermediaries are commanding such 
public attention and producing and distributing such content, it seems appropriate to 
ask what responsibilities they plan to take on, and whether some of the rules that apply 
to traditional media organisations should apply to them. Should, for example, there 
be rules regarding the use of these platforms by political parties or politicians in the 
lead up to an election? How comfortable should democratic societies be that dialogue 
between politicians and the public be mediated by these commercial corporations – 
corporations that have their own political views? Should these organisations be able 
to determine which sites gain the most attention (by providing a low cost or no cost 
gateway), and thereby compromise equality of access?
The power of these information intermediaries to command mass attention can be 
used for public goods and purposes, for commercial ends, or indeed for self-interested 
and potentially harmful ends. It can be used during humanitarian emergencies, in the 
lead up to democratic elections, or to solve healthcare questions. Democratic societies 
need to ask themselves whether they are happy to outsource these roles to private 
companies, and examine more closely what mechanisms should be in place for when 
things go wrong.
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2. The power to communicate news
When, in May 2015, Facebook announced it had done a deal with nine news 
organisations to host their content it was, to many within the industry, unsurprising. 
More than that, it was – in the words of media commentator Steve Hewlett – seen 
as a ‘win-win’.194 News organisations could spread their content further, Facebook 
would gain more valuable content for its newsfeed. Yet for some of those inside 
and outside the industry ‘Facebook Instant Articles’, as it was called, looked quite 
strange. Here were some of the world’s most prestigious news organisations uploading 
their stories, their pictures, their videos, into Facebook’s own system, making 
Facebook the publishing platform. Why would they do this?195
The news organisations did it willingly because of the reach and attention 
Facebook can give them. No news organization can claim to be viewed regularly by 
over a billion people. Facebook can. The 2015 Reuters Institute Digital News Report 
found that across twelve countries, 41 per cent of people surveyed now used Facebook 
‘to find, read, watch, share, or comment on the news each week – more than twice the 
usage of its nearest rival’.196 A 2014 report from the Pew Research Center found that 
‘Roughly two-thirds (64 per cent) of U.S. adults use the site [Facebook], and half of 
those users get news there — amounting to 30 per cent of the general population’.197 
In the UK, Ofcom found that the use of social media for news leapt 11 per cent from 
2014 to 2015, from 20 per cent to 31 per cent.198
Looking at younger generations, particularly ‘Millenials’ (18-33 year olds), the 
importance of social media as a channel for news is even more stark. ‘About six-in-ten 
online Millennials (61 per cent) report getting political news on Facebook in a given 
week’, the Pew Research Center found. They are also much more likely to find news 
via Google, one third (33 per cent) sourcing their political news from Google News. 
This sharply contrasts the younger generation from their parents. The Pew Center 
writes, ‘that younger and older generations espouse fundamental differences in the 
ways they stay informed about political news’.199
Facebook is one of a handful of US information intermediaries through which 
people are finding news. 320 million people regularly used Twitter in 2015.200 Twitter 
had become such an important source of news that democratic governments have 
asked it to maintain its services during elections, and less democratic countries have 
sought to cut it off (see US on Iran 2009, and Uganda 2016). By 2015, search engines 
such as Google had taken over from traditional news organisations as trusted news 
sources, according to a survey published in January,201 even though Google and others 
aggregate rather than gather the news.
‘The starting point to a news journey’, the 2015 Digital News Report stated, ‘is 
less likely to be a brand homepage and increasingly likely to be via a search engine, 
a social network, email, or the lockscreen of a smartphone’. Yet, if Facebook Instant 
Articles succeeds, industry experts note, some of these information intermediaries 
may be the end point for news as well as the starting point.202
Other information intermediaries, recognizing the importance of news to promote 
traffic, began introducing competitive news distribution services. Apple introduced a 
‘FlipBoard-like’ news service in late 2015. Unlike some of the existing algorithmically 
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generated news services, like Google news, Apple hired journalists to “help identify 
and deliver the best in breaking national, global, and local news… These editors will 
help [Apple] News users find the best and most timely coverage of major news events, 
while also managing select categories based on their areas of professional expertise.” 
To most people this sounds similar to a traditional newsroom, and was described as 
such by some.203 Apple, for its part, chose not to make clear exactly how news would 
be chosen. Then in October 2015 Twitter launched ‘Moments’, a curated news 
service that helped you ‘discover stories unfolding on Twitter’.204 Again, this was seen 
as a move towards becoming a media business. Moments shows that Twitter is ‘the 
latest technology company to push further into the media business’, the Financial 
Times reported.205
These, and other emerging services, give these information intermediaries a crucial 
role in determining what news citizens are exposed to (or not exposed to), how 
diverse this news is, and how it is prioritized and filtered. Mark Zuckerberg described 
Facebook’s eventual aspiration as being able to give everyone their own tailored news 
outlet: “Our goal is to build the perfect personalized newspaper for every person in the 
world.”206
The news organisations are, in this sense, losing their power to set the news agenda, 
and help inform the public. Emily Bell goes further and argues that:
“News spaces are no longer owned by newsmakers. The press is no longer in 
charge of the free press and has lost control of the main conduits through which 
stories reach audiences. The public sphere is now operated by a small number of 
private companies, based in Silicon Valley.”207
This is a critical shift in power. Yet it comes without any of the long build up that 
accompanied the development of the Fourth Estate and its semi-constitutional role. 
As such, it remains unclear the extent to which different information intermediaries 
define themselves in part by their independence from government, what journalistic 
codes – if any – they adhere to, or how seriously they take their civic responsibilities. 
As Natali Helberger writes: ‘so far there has been little indication of either a 
commitment to journalism ethics such as a sense of informing citizens for public 
interest or an interest in setting an identifiable political agenda. The companies behind 
these new gatekeepers provide little to no information on these matters, making a 
systematic academic assessment difficult.’208
There is some evidence, however, that the information intermediaries have started 
to acknowledge this role. Mark Zuckerberg said, in 2014, that he was conscious 
of it and was ready to accept and embrace it. ‘We take our role in this civic debate 
really seriously’ Mark Zuckerberg said at a townhall Q&A hosted by Facebook in 
December 2014. Access to diverse opinions was, Zuckerberg said, ‘really important’ 
and he argued that, thanks to Facebook, people were much more likely to discover 
diverse views than in the past. ‘That means whatever TV station you might listen to 
that has an opinion, whatever news you might read, on Facebook you’re hearing from 
a broader set of people… than you would have from any other type of media that you 
would have consumed” (Facebook Townhall Q&A, 2014). So concerned was he 
about diversity that he linked to a separate Facebook post by Eytan Bakshy about his 
work on echo chambers.209
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Google has said it takes its role similarly seriously. It supported a news ‘Trust 
Project’ that ‘crafts tangible digital strategies to fulfill journalism’s basic pledge: to 
serve society with a truthful, intelligent and comprehensive account of ideas and 
events’.210 Explaining the project, Richard Gingras and Sally Lehrman wrote that 
‘Online chaos deserves radical action’ and that it is ‘time to consider new approaches’ 
to helping people figure out whether to trust news’.211
Yet, in most cases we have to accept these organisations’ commitment on trust. We 
cannot assess, for example, how they filter and prioritise news because this is done 
opaquely, via algorithms (notably Facebook’s ‘Edgerank’ and Google News).
From the citizen’s perspective, accepting this commitment is problematic. When 
almost all our news is channeled through particular gateways then, as citizens, it is 
important that we are aware which information is filtered and why. Google’s definition 
of important, or accurate, or impartial, or relevant, news may be different from ours. 
Yet without knowing how it is determining what we see, we cannot judge.
A range of civic questions follow from this. What are the principles, if any, to which 
these algorithms adhere? Should such principles be universal? Where is the internal 
governance to reassure us that these algorithms are being used fairly? What are the 
self-regulatory arrangements to prevent abuse and react if abuse occurs? How can we 
insure against discriminatory algorithms? How can we even assess whether we are in a 
partisan information ‘filter bubble’?212
On the ‘filter bubble’ question, Facebook tried to reassure its users by 
commissioning some research. Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic sought to test whether 
Facebook’s algorithms were reducing the amount of ideologically diverse news and 
opinions people were receiving in their news feed. They discovered that they were, 
although people’s choice of friends had a greater impact than the algorithms.213
Yet rather than reassure its users and critics, the Facebook research inflamed 
them. Academics and others questioned the sampling, the approach and the framing 
of the findings. Christian Sandvig and others noted that the sample was likely to 
be highly skewed from the average because of the criteria used (explicit affiliation 
with a political party).214 Zeynep Tufekci highlighted how strange it was to compare 
individual choice to algorithmic choice when the two are complementary on 
Facebook.215 Eli Pariser, the author of The Filter Bubble, wrote how the study showed 
that ‘there is a real and scientifically significant “filter bubble effect” ’ although the 
study downplays the role of Facebook’s algorithm in that effect.216
While observers may be worried about the filter bubble effect, the information 
intermediaries seem much less so. When Larry Page, Alphabet’s chief executive, was 
questioned about it in 2013 he said ‘People have a lot of concern about that—I’m 
totally not worried about that at all. It sounds kind of funny to say but that’s totally 
under your control’.217
There are equally important questions regarding how news is chosen, and which 
news organisations are prioritized over others. Facebook Instant Articles launched 
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with a series of large and high profile news partners. YouTube news search results are 
weighted to ‘trusted news providers’ though YouTube does not publish the names of 
these providers.218 Twitter Moments states that ‘When selecting Moments around 
controversial topics, we will choose topics that are big news in the mainstream press or 
are demonstrably large public conversations on Twitter’.219
Though one can understand why these large intermediaries would find it easier 
to partner with, and to prioritise, news from large established news organisations, 
this will narrow the diversity of news and create structural barriers for smaller news 
providers.
Giving a handful of US commercial corporations dominant control of the 
distribution of news and information, particularly when many of their methods 
for filtering news are opaque and when they have limited accountability, carries 
with it democratic risk. As James Ball wrote in The Guardian, ‘Whether you are 
an ardent First Amendment advocate or a passionate believer that networks must 
do more to police their backyards, the worst of all possible worlds for the flow of 
information is one in which we shift from the rule of democratic law to one governed 
by the arbitrary, inconsistent and perhaps kneejerk rulings of a tiny group of large 
companies’.220
These commercial organisations, however well meaning, will have goals that will 
not always coincide with those of all the democratic publics they are serving. With 
regards to civic purpose, their primary goals may not always be towards open, non-
discriminatory and diverse public spaces or to news values that coincide with those of 
every citizen. Nor is it apparent whether they will have the resolve of traditional news 
organisations when it comes to publishing news on their platforms that governments 
do not like.
These organisations could, should they wish, address some of these concerns. 
They could, for example, set up independent internal governance structures, like the 
Scott Trust at The Guardian, to set out the principles by which news is gathered and 
distributed, and to scrutinize the algorithms that direct news. Alternatively they could 
institute forms of public oversight.
The case for public oversight of search, and algorithm transparency, was made as 
far back as 2000. In ‘Shaping the Web: Why the politics of search engines matters’ 
Introna and Nissenbaum suggested that search engines ‘systematially exclude’ certain 
destinations, that this runs ‘counter to the basic architecture of the web’ and that the 
market alone is unlikely to solve the problem.221 Laura Granka added further nuance 
to the question in 2010, arguing that we needed to examine diversity within platforms 
and services, not between them.222 Yet there remains little consensus about the nature 
of the problem, and even less about possible responses.
We are still only starting to learn about the effect that these changes are having 
on public understanding and civic participation. Yet they are happening so quickly 
we need to learn fast and better assess the implications before these changes become 
fixed and we find that, as democratic citizens, we rely for our news on channels about 
which we know little and over which we have minimal influence.
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3. The power to enable collective action
“I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him, actually. This   
revolution started online. This revolution started on Facebook.” - Wael   
Ghonim, from transcript at ‘Mark Zuckerberg, Modern Day Moses?’ Business  
Insider 223
There is plenty of debate about the role that Facebook, and other technology 
platforms, played in the Egyptian revolution of 2011. Yet there is evidence that these 
large social media platforms – notably Facebook and Twitter – were critical in the 
early stages for sharing information, co-ordinating dissent, as an entry point for those 
who were nervous about supporting a non-conformist movement, and as an indication 
of the strength and depth of opposition to the regime.224 Prior to the Egyptian uprising 
of 2011, Schmidt and Cohen write, Twitter was also used to co-ordinate action in 
Moldova, Youtube was used to spread activist information in Iran, and Facebook was 
used to organise a mass demonstration in Columbia.225
In May 2011 Mark Zuckerberg played down the importance of Facebook to Egypt, 
telling the eG8 that “It would be extremely arrogant for any specific technology 
company to claim credit. People are now having the opportunity to communicate, 
that’s not a Facebook thing. That’s an Internet thing.”226
While Zuckerberg may have been right to disclaim credit, it would seem peculiar 
not to acknowledge the growing importance of Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, 
Instagram, and a handful of other digital tools to twenty-first-century campaigns and 
social movements. Indeed for many the argument has moved beyond whether digital 
media does or does not help enable protest or political action to the roles that it plays 
within different protests and the affects that this has.227
Zeynep Tufecki argues convincingly that social media is now central to political 
movements, and to their structure: 
‘Social media, an integral aspect of all these movements, is not a mere ‘tool’ 
that is external to the organizational and cultural structure of these movements. 
Instead, it has become increasingly clear that communication is a form of 
organization, and the form of communication strongly interacts with the form of 
organization.’228
Certainly, it is now a given that democratic publics will use Twitter, Facebook, 
Youtube and associated messenger services for civic engagement, debate, and support. 
People show their political support or solidarity, for example, through Twitter: 
#jesuisparis #blacklivesmatter #hometovote #refugeeswelcome, #IStandWithAhmed, 
#icantbreathe. Political discussion groups, like Partisan Exchange and Master 
Debates, thrive on Facebook. Debates between political candidates attract thousands 
of comments on YouTube (see, for example, ‘2nd CNN Republican Presidential 
Debate Part 1/5 Sept. 16, 2015’). At the very least, Facebook and other similar 
technologies lower the organizational costs of co-ordination and participation by 
creating digital tools that make joining and supporting more straightforward.229
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Supporters of political action turn to social media to rally support and to co-
ordinate activism. Supporters of Alexander Navalny, a Russian politician and activist, 
used Facebook to organise action in protest against his prosecution in December 
2014. Young participants in the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2014 used 
Facebook as their main platform.230
This type of participation will rise and become more mainstream, predicts Ethan 
Zuckerman, head of MIT’s Centre for Civic Media. It ‘will become the norm, not the 
exception,’ Zuckerman writes, ‘for political and activist campaigns to rely on social 
media, crowdfunding and other digital techniques as well as advertising, lobbying and 
conventional fundraising’.231 
Social media is already often central to democratic election campaigns. For the 
2015 UK General Election campaign the Conservative Party spent more than £1.2 
million on Facebook, according to accounts filed with the Electoral Commission.232 
The platform helped the Party ‘microtarget’ and to enable it to have multiple contacts 
with undecided voters in the weeks and months before the election. Facebook was, 
according to an interview with Jim Messina – a senior advisor to the Conservative 
campaign – ‘the crucial weapon’.233 Equally, candidates were more than twice as likely 
to link to Youtube from Twitter – often to a party political video – than they were to 
BBC news.234
Since certain platforms are so dominant, political action and movements are able 
to gain reach and scale quickly. In 2014 the ‘ice bucket challenge’ became a ‘global 
phenomenon, with more than 17 million videos watched on Facebook by more 
than 440 million people — and more than $100 million raised [for research into Lou 
Gehrig’s disease and for other charitable causes].’235
The dominance of these platforms also enables people to see many of the causes 
that others have supported (and not supported), and keep a record of their own 
support. Chris Wells argues that digital tools have become not only essential to 
engagement with and co-ordination of political action, but are also becoming central 
to an individual’s political identity. ‘Part of being a late modern citizen’ Wells writes, 
‘means that your choices are constitutive of your civic identity rather than the other 
way around; every choice is an expression that makes you who you are’.236 
Empowering people to come together to co-ordinate action for political change can 
have major civic benefits. It can augment civic participation. It can enable, enhance 
and accelerate collective action. It can lower the obstacles to supporting a political 
issue, party or figure. It can boost fundraising for causes like environment, tax reform 
or civil liberties. 
Here again the new information intermediaries are supplementing and even 
superseding the role of the press, in terms of campaigning and co-ordination. Where 
previously a local newspaper would have begun a campaign on an issue of civic 
importance, such a campaign is now much more likely to begin on Facebook or 
Twitter, whether this is to save a library, to stop a bypass, or find a missing child. 
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Yet the public often choose to use these intermediaries as though they are civic 
spaces, when they are private, commercial spaces. As Ethan Zuckerman put it:
‘Hosting your political movement on YouTube is a little like trying to hold a 
rally in a shopping mall. It looks like a public space, but it’s not – it’s a private 
space, and your use of it is governed by an agreement that works harder to protect 
YouTube’s fiscal viability than to protect your rights of free speech.’237
As private commercial spaces they have their own rules and means of enforcing 
them – as do shopping malls with private security firms. ‘‘We use the information 
we have [about you] to help verify accounts and activity,’ Facebook writes, ‘and 
to promote safety and security on and off of our Services, such as by investigating 
suspicious activity or violations of our terms or policies’.238 Once on the platform users 
have to adhere to the rules of its commercial owner.
This might be less of a concern were a handful of information intermediaries not 
so dominant. The dominance of a small number of organisations, while it can be a 
great benefit, can also be a danger. It can mean that people do not have an equivalent 
choice. If they want their campaign to be a success, it has to be on one of these 
platforms or other people will not see it and will be less able to support or participate 
in it. 
The controllers of these spaces are free to intervene to disable civic action should 
they want to. The Facebook page set up by Navalny supporters was reportedly 
blocked by Facebook at the request of the Russian prosecutor’s office.239 New pages 
were soon set up and ‘Facebook and Twitter said they would not block any protest 
pages in Russia’.240 In Hong Kong a popular cartoon collective which was promoting 
the pro-democracy referendum found its Facebook administration page blocked. 
Its administrator ‘spent weeks lobbying Facebook to unblock the site, with little 
progress’.241
Political parties that come to rely on the tools of these organisations may suddenly 
find they are removed. In 2011/12, for example, President Obama’s campaign team 
used online tools to register more than a million people online and to raise $690 
million.242 One of the tools they used, which proved highly influential, was Facebook’s 
targeted sharing. This allowed Facebook users to share their friends with the Obama 
campaign, and for the campaign to tell them with which friends to share campaign 
material. Facebook altered this tool in 2014 to prevent it being done again.243
The dominance also means that these organisations record lots of information about 
an individual’s political activities, all kept linked together in one place. Where, in 
the past, someone might have attended a political rally, made an occasional donation 
to a political party, read political texts from the library, and been friends with a 
political radical, little of this would have been recorded by democratic governments, 
and certainly not recorded centrally. Now, partly thanks to the emergence of the 
tech giants and their platforms, most of this information is recorded on one, or a 
small number, of central databases. This is leading, for many of us, to what might be 
characterized as a digital political self. This digital political self could be of significant 
value to us, and to others. Indeed Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen argue that ‘Identity 
will be the most valuable commodity for citizens in the future, and it will exist 
primarily online’.244
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Information about our political activities can, for example, be of great interest to 
governments, especially autocratic ones. As Evgeny Morozov has illustrated, digital 
tools can help governments more easily identify political activity and dissent.245
In China they have recognized the value of these platforms as a means of co-
ordinating dissent and sought to disrupt them. Research by Gary King, Jennifer Pan 
and Margaret Roberts has found that, contrary to previously held assumptions, the 
Chinese government let people speak relatively freely online. It only intervened, and 
intervened strongly, when people start to co-ordinate collective action. King’s findings 
‘show that the [Chinese government’s] censorship program is aimed at curtailing 
collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social 
mobilization, regardless of content’.246
Nor is it just non-democratic governments that are interested in people’s 
political activities. The UK government made it clear in 2014 that it would like the 
information intermediaries to keep watch over communication on their platforms and 
pass on any information that may indicate possible terrorist activity to the authorities. 
Facebook, and companies like it, ‘should accept they have a responsibility to notify 
the relevant authorities’ the UK government said following the investigation into 
the death of Fusilier Lee Rigby, ‘when an automatic trigger indicating terrorism is 
activated and allow the authorities, whether US or UK, to take the next step’.247
Democratic governments’ interest in tracking political dissent has also, historically, 
extended well beyond terrorism. For many years, for example, the UK police 
infiltrated activist groups for the purpose of intelligence and disruption. The Special 
Demonstration Squad (SDS) was a covert unit within the UK Metropolitan Police 
that embedded police in domestic political groups between 1968 and 2008. Over 
many years, an investigation into the unit found in 2014, the SDS ‘placed undercover 
officers inside a wide range of activist groups, targeted principally around the groups’ 
potential for committing, fomenting or providing intelligence on public disorder’.248 
This included environmental protestors and ‘an undercover officer in the SDS [who] 
was working within the “Lawrence family camp” during the judicial inquiry into 
the Metropolitan Police’s botched investigation into the teenager’s murder’. The 
information provided by officers led to dozens of convictions, many of which were 
subsequently overturned since evidence critical to their conviction was hidden during 
their trial.249
Although many of the information intermediaries have made commitments 
regarding freedom of speech and privacy (as part of the Global Network Initiative), 
they have not made parallel commitments regarding freedom of association. Though, 
as seen in China, freedom of association may be as important to political dissent as 
freedom of expression.
Most of the large technology companies release transparency reports, in which 
they document the requests made by governments and law enforcement – chiefly 
for user data. Although companies like Google and Twitter began these prior to 
the Edward Snowden leaks in 2013, many more started publishing similar reports 
following the leaks. These help indicate the extent of government requests if not the 
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nature of individual requests. Towards the end of 2015, Ranking Digital Rights, a 
project to assess the disclosure and practices of sixteen of the largest internet and 
telecommunications companies, published its first ‘Corporate Accountability Index’. 
The index ranked each company according to 31 indicators, based around issues that 
affected their users’ free expression and privacy. Google led the rankings, with a 65 
per cent rating, whilt Microsoft came third and Facebook eighth (of sixteen). 250
Global information intermediaries now have tremendous power when it comes to 
collective action. They already help enable it, they can choose to disable it, or make 
it more difficult. They can, should they choose, work with authorities, overtly or 
covertly, to identify the participants in the action and the leaders of it. Yet much of the 
control for how this information is captured and used, who it is passed on to, and how 
it may be discovered, remains with the information intermediaries.
Concerns about preserving free speech online are long established, and action to 
protect and enhance free speech ongoing. Yet fewer concerns are expressed about the 
need to preserve and enhance our ability to co-ordinate collective action using these 
digital tools. The information intermediaries themselves could act to mollify concerns 
about their policies. They could, for example, be more transparent about when they 
are working with the authorities, the reasons for that co-operation, and the results of 
it. They could set out the principles by which they will or will not enable collective 
action. They could enable greater interoperability so that people can transfer their 
political profiles and their campaigns to other platforms and other spaces.
Social media platforms may not have sought this power and, based on Zuckerberg’s 
2011 comment at the eG8, may rather defer it. However, now that they have it, 
they will need to decide how to use it, protect it, and evolve it. Equally, democratic 
societies have to consider whether citizens need greater protection to associate freely 
online.
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4. The power to give people a voice
Inherent in our understanding of the power of the net is its capacity to enable 
expression. Thanks chiefly to the net, Hillary Clinton said in 2010, ‘information 
has never been so free. There are more ways to spread more ideas to more people 
than at any moment in history’. This capacity then forms the basis, Clinton said, 
for international accord: ‘Information freedom supports the peace and security that 
provides a foundation for global progress’.251
The internet’s capacity to enable expression, innovation, and the spread of ideas 
is such that some have suggested it may require a redefinition of free expression. 
Speaking in 2009 Jack Balkin argued that, in the twentieth century, we developed a 
narrow concept of freedom of speech as a consequence of information scarcity. Yet, 
‘the digital age makes increasingly clear that the point of the free speech principle is 
to promote not merely democracy, but something larger: a democratic culture’ Such a 
culture would recognize the importance of participation, sharing, and creation as well 
as speech itself.252
Some of the tech giants, such as Alphabet/Google, have been integral in enabling 
such an expansion of free expression. Indeed many see it as synonymous with their 
purpose. ‘[W]e want to give everyone a voice’ Mark Zuckerberg said at a Facebook 
Townhall Q&A in December 2014.253 ‘I think we at Google pretty clearly have a 
strong desire for freedom of speech, for a free flow of information’ Larry Page said at 
the Google I/O in 2013.254 ‘The Tweets must flow’ Biz Stone from Twitter wrote in 
2011; ‘Our goal is to instantly connect people everywhere to what is most meaningful 
to them. For this to happen, freedom of expression is essential’.255
Consciously or unconsciously, some of these values were built into the technology 
of these organisations and their services from the start. The view of many information 
intermediaries appeared to be that their role was simply to give people a platform 
on which to express themselves, with virtually no constraints on how they used that 
platform. In this way their interpretation of free expression seemed closer to the 
broader conception as outlined by Jack Balkin, rather than the narrower 20th century 
ideal. They saw themselves as enabling a much richer and more democratic space 
than existed under previous media.
‘Whereas the traditional press is called the fourth estate, this space might be called 
the “interconnected estate”’ Eric Schmidt wrote of the web, ‘a place where any person 
with access to the Internet, regardless of living standard or nationality, is given a voice 
and the power to effect change’.256
Old media was intrinsically narrow, Zuckerberg said at an event in 2014, limiting 
the space to only a small number of voices. By contrast, new media enables everyone 
to speak:
If some events like this [a Townhall Q&A] had happened 50 years ago then you 
might have only read about it from the newspapers or TV, and a few voices. But 
now what we’re trying to do is make it so that every single person in the world has 
a voice and a channel and can share their opinions or research or facts that they’ve 
come across and can broadcast that out to their friends and family and people who 
follow them and want to hear what they have to say.257
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Yet, over the last decade, most of the large technology companies have shifted 
their positions, in response to cultural, commercial and government pressures. They 
have introduced more rules to govern speech and participation, and instituted more 
mechanisms for the removal of people and content that transgress these rules. Though 
this may be their prerogative as private companies, their size and dominance make it 
a broader societal issue. Especially since these organisations have frequently changed 
their approach in an ad hoc manner, with limited transparency, and without a clear 
indication of the principles which inform the process or where it will end.
Twitter was one of the most vocal in its commitment to free speech principles. 
“Our general council [sic] and CEO like to say that we are the free speech wing of 
the free speech party” Twitter’s UK general manager told a conference audience in 
2012.258 This is because “We have a fundamental belief” Evan Williams, co-founder 
of Twitter, told the BBC in 2010 “… that the open exchange of information has a 
positive impact on the world”.259
Yet it has found its fundamentalist approach to free speech challenged by countries, 
by corporations and by individuals. In France and Germany, for example, publication 
of pro-Nazi content is illegal. In response, rather than remove such content globally, 
Twitter started filtering content geographically in 2010.260 
Then, in February 2015, the chief executive Dick Costolo made a frank admission. 
‘We suck at dealing with abuse and trolls on the platform and we’ve sucked at it 
for years’ he wrote in an internal memorandum. ‘We’re going to start kicking these 
people off right and left and making sure that when they issue their ridiculous attacks, 
nobody hears them’.261
This mea culpa, four months before Costolo stepped down as CEO, came after 
years of criticism of Twitter for not adequately dealing with threats, harassment, 
stalking, incitement to suicide, and other forms of abuse on the micro-blogging 
platform. Much of this abuse was directed at women and, according to Costolo, was 
causing people to leave Twitter.
Following its chief executive’s admission, Twitter introduced new tools for users 
and opened a Safety Center in July 2015.262 It is not clear, however, if Twitter was 
‘kicking these people off right and left’ as Costolo said they would. To that point 
Twitter had not release detailed information about who had, or had not, been 
removed. The evidence to date had largely been collected by organisations outside 
Twitter, such as the Brookings project. Brookings conducted a study on Twitter 
accounts that were using the platform to disseminate ISIS propaganda and messaging. 
From this we know that from September through December 2014 ‘at least 46,000 
Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters’. Of these ‘A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-
supporting accounts were suspended between September and December 2014, and 
we saw evidence of potentially thousands more.’263
We also know that Twitter’s new rigour went beyond radical extremists. In May 
2015 it blocked a US non-profit service that captured the deleted tweets of politicians 
(see section on holding power to account). We know this not because Twitter 
announced it, but because the Sunlight Foundation, which ran the service, told its 
users.264 It unblocked the service at the end of 2015.
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As a commercial company, and one that has struggled to find a sustainable 
business model, Twitter is free to change its rules and its policies as it chooses. ‘It 
is not our role to be any sort of arbiter of global speech’, Twitter’s General Counsel 
wrote in The Washington Post in April 2015.265 Yet, as the service becomes integral 
to the communication of news and information, the civic implications of its changes 
increase. As long ago as 2009 Twitter suspended maintenance of its service to ensure 
its continued use as a communication tool in Iran during the elections.266
Twitter may be the clearest example of a digital intermediary that has had to adapt 
its approach to free expression since it started, but many others have followed a similar 
path.
Facebook has always had a more controlled environment than Twitter. This was 
partly driven by its aim to be a social utility, as useful and accessible for 13-year-olds 
as for 70-year-olds. ‘As the product [Facebook] was developed for the U.S. market, 
it is designed to be safe for any 13-year-old in the U.S… making all Facebook users 
the moral equivalents of 13-year-old American teenagers’.267 Facebook’s ‘Community 
standards’ indicate what its users are, and are not, allowed to publish and share.268 
Although within these there is an ‘extraordinary level of discretion left to the 
Facebook content regulators’.269 In 2015 it added more detail on content that it allows 
or bans on the platform.270
Apple has always exercised discretion over the services it offers via iTunes and 
other Apple platforms. The company has emphasised the need to filter for quality 
control and security purposes, though there have been examples where other criteria 
appear to have been applied. An app called ‘Drones+’, that tracked US drone strikes, 
was rejected three times for three different reasons.271
Commercial pressure has also led to the removal of voices and content from the 
services of digital intermediaries. Legislation like the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) in the U.S. and the E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/
EC) provide a framework in which the digital intermediaries are required to remove 
content at the request of rights-holders.272 ‘Thus forms one type of Internet-based 
regulatory mechanism that can be explained through regulatory capitalism’ Benjamin 
Farrand writes, ‘Legislation is passed that imposes a regulatory role upon the providers 
of information hosting services, in exchange for immunity from suit so long as that 
regulation is performed’.273
Data protection law in Europe has also forced information intermediaries to review 
their approach to free expression. In 2014 the European Court ruled that individuals 
had the right to ask search engines to remove links that led to content which contained 
personal information about them if that information was ‘inaccurate, inadequate, 
irrelevant or excessive’. The ruling was based on the 1995 Data Protection Directive. 
Referred to as the ‘right to be forgotten’, though perhaps better described as the right-
to-be-obscured, the ruling meant that search engines had an obligation to institute 
systems that enabled people to make link-removal requests (see Case C-131/12, 
Google vs Mario Costeja Gonzalez, May 13 2014). Due to its dominance in search, 
the ruling fell disproportionately onto Google.
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As a consequence Google instituted procedures and hired personnel to allow people 
to make removal requests, and to enable it to judge whether it would accept or reject 
them. A year after the European Court ruling Google said they had received over 
250,000 data removal requests related to nearly a million URLs.274
Democratic governments and politicians have likewise exerted pressure on 
information intermediaries to restrict free expression. Amazon dropped Wikileaks’ 
diplomatic cables from its cloud servers shortly after it was contacted by the office of 
the chair of the Senate homeland committee, though Amazon denied this was as a 
consequence of political pressure.275 
Over the last decade the large information intermediaries have become enormously 
powerful in giving people a voice. In a single day in August 2015 over a billion people 
were active on Facebook. Yet over the same period they have also grown increasingly 
likely to take that voice away. They have often done this in response to cultural, 
commercial, and political challenges, and often for entirely comprehensible and 
defensible reasons. Yet many changes have also been made in an ad hoc and opaque 
manner that makes it difficult to evaluate their impact.
These ad hoc responses were inevitable given that these organisations in many cases 
deliberately chose not have systems by which to make editorial choices. ‘A senior 
executive of a social platform admitted to me recently’ Emily Bell, director of the Tow 
Center said in 2014, ‘that they knew editing their platform for problematic content 
was a persistent and growing problem, ‘but we have no system for it’, he said, ‘We 
scramble a small group into a war room and make decisions on an ad hoc basis. We 
know it is a problem’.276
Even when they have instituted systems these have been criticised for not being 
transparent. 80 internet scholars wrote an open letter to Google in May 2015 saying 
that the ‘The vast majority of these [Google’s] decisions face no public scrutiny, 
though they shape public discourse’ and arguing that the ‘implementation of the [right 
to be forgotten] ruling should be much more transparent’.277 In response to pressure 
from governments, Google, Facebook, Microsoft and others joined the Global 
Network Initiative (GNI). The GNI aims ‘to advance the freedom of expression and 
privacy rights of Internet users worldwide’ by providing companies with a framework 
for how to consider these issues and making them commit to an assessment of their 
adherence to GNI’s principles (from globalnetworkiniative.org). Yet it is unclear 
how much practical effect GNI will have or whether the participation of the tech 
companies is symbolic or material.278
As US commercial corporations it is the digital intermediaries’ prerogative to make 
their own rules and decide how to deal with people and the content they publish. As 
private companies they are not subject to the requirements of the First Amendment. 
However, since they have reached such a size, reach and dominance, this puts them in 
positions of immense power with regard to the future of free expression. For this reason 
people have argued that Google executives ‘exercise far more power over speech than 
does the [US] Supreme Court’.279
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Democratic publics, and their governments, have to consider at what stage this 
becomes problematic. Now these organisations can give people a voice they can also 
take it away and, as commercial organizations, they do not need to say why. Given the 
dominance of these services, going to another service is often not a viable option. If 
these organisations choose to withdraw someone’s right to express themselves on their 
platform, should they be required to make that transparent? Should people have an 
opportunity to challenge these organizations’ commitment to free expression? When 
does our reliance on these platforms as a means of expression become too great? Do 
democratic societies have an obligation to ensure more devolved, decentralized, public 
spaces?
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5. The Power to Influence People’s Vote
In the lead up to the UK Election in May 2015 Facebook kept track of the level 
of engagement of its UK users with political parties and issues. Based on this 
engagement it found that, of the total engagement with the two main parties, the 
Conservatives received 55.7 per cent (12.2m interactions), and Labour 44.3 per cent 
(9.7m interactions). This was, as Mark Shephard has pointed out, ‘within plus or 
minus one per cent of the actual ratio of vote share for the two main parties’ and, if 
combined with seat share ‘it was arguably a better predictor than many predictions 
derived from opinion polls.280
We do not know whether Facebook has found similar correlations in other elections 
– but the numbers are closer to the actual result than the predictions of the UK polling 
companies. When asked, for this study, Facebook did not comment on the value of 
using interactions as a predictor. At the least, it illustrates how closely Facebook is 
tracking the political interactions of its users in the lead up to an election.
There has long been recognition of the power of traditional media to influence the 
outcome of elections. Yet some are now starting to look at the power of the new digital 
intermediaries in predicting and potentially influencing the outcome. Indeed some are 
now claiming that the digital intermediaries could have a profound effect on elections 
in at least three ways: by effecting voter turnout; by influencing the information 
people are exposed to about an individual candidate or party (either deliberately or 
via the algorithmic ‘filter bubble’ effect); or by enabling the microtargeting of specific 
individuals with particular views in precise locations.
The first influence, about effecting voter turnout, was illustrated by a study by 
Facebook itself. ‘A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political 
mobilization’ found that ‘political mobilization messages’, in this case prompts on 
people’s Facebook profiles, could spur people to vote.281 Others, including Jonathan 
Zittrain, then showed that, should this prompt only be shown to supporters of one 
party, it could be enough to swing the result.282
The second influence on voting, regarding the information people are exposed 
to about an individual candidate or party, was raised by two academics in research 
published in 2015. Robert Epstein and Ronald E. Robertson reported on experiments 
that tested whether the results displayed about a political candidate by a search 
engine, and the order in which they were displayed, could be manipulated in order 
to affect people’s voting preferences.283 Based on their experiments they found that 
‘biased search rankings can shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20 per 
cent or more’ and ‘the shift can be much higher in some demographic groups’.284
Google strongly rejected the study’s findings. ‘There is absolutely no truth to 
Epstein’s hypothesis that Google could work secretly to influence election outcomes’, 
Amit Singhal, head of Google search, wrote on Politico.com. ‘Just as any electoral 
system must be trusted to be considered valid, so too must our search results’.285 This 
was similar to Google’s response to Epstein two years earlier, when Google responded, 
that it would not be in its interests to manipulate search results: ‘Providing relevant 
answers has been the cornerstone of Google’s approach to search from the very 
beginning’.
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Yet, even if one accepts Google’s response, this does not protect against the filter 
bubble problem. In other words, that the search results might be distorted because of 
an individual’s search history (Google Tailored Search), or by the searches of many 
people. This can lead, Epstein argues, to a ‘digital bandwagon effect’ in which, ‘as 
more people get election-related information through the Internet… algorithms have 
perhaps been having a say in selecting our leaders’.286
Moreover, given that search engines are, according to the January 2015 Edelman 
Trust Barometer, more trusted than news organisations, there is good reason to believe 
that people would be as - if not more - influenced by the results they find when they 
key a candidate’s name into search as by content published by a traditional news 
organisation.287
The third aspect of influence relates to the potential to microtarget specific 
individuals, with particular views, in precise locations. By cross-correllation of data, 
combined with qualitative research, it is now possible to identify, with a high degree 
of accuracy, undecided or swing voters in marginal political districts and the messages 
that are likely to have most impact on them. Using this information one could target, 
for example, men between 50 and 60 living in a particular area who are anxious about 
immigration and welfare. This type of targeting is what the Conservatives were doing, 
with the help of Jim Messina, in the lead up to the May 2015 General Election.
“We were having as many as eight to ten conversations with undecided voters 
in the final week,” Jim Messina, a campaign strategy advisor for the Conservatives 
said, “while Labour was still, in the final week, mailing every single person in the 
constituency. And that just didn’t make sense.”288
Facebook was key to this strategy, according to Messina, particularly in finding 
specific people in marginal constituencies:
“We went in and took very deep dives in the seats and to see what was do-
able, what was winnable . . . who were the voters, who were potential waverers, 
thinking about leaving the Lib Dems; who were the voters trying to decide 
between us and Labour; and who were the voters considering leaving us for Ukip 
— and we were able to have very focused messages to all of those people.” 
Messina was convinced it worked: “I think the proof is in the pudding that we now 
hold every single west UK Lib Dem seat.”289
It is almost impossible to test Messina’s claims since the campaign was conducted 
privately and Facebook does not release its data. Though it is clear that, from 
Messina’s perspective, microtargeting through social media tech giants like Facebook, 
is a critical and increasingly integral part of modern election campaigning, and 
central to identifying and influencing swing voters. In this way it is different from, 
supplementary to, and more powerful than the role played by the local newspaper, or 
television advertisement.
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Yet, unlike broadcast campaign communication in the UK and many other 
democracies, there are no rules surrounding the use of social media or arrangements 
made with the tech giants. At the same time it is extremely hard to monitor or analyse 
the use of social media platforms like Facebook for microtargeting since their use 
is private and the data held by the companies themselves. This opacity may make 
them more powerful. As Steven Lukes wrote in his seminal book, ‘power is at its 
most effective when least observable’.290 Similarly with search engines, the increasing 
tailoring of search results will make it ‘difficult or impossible for regulators to detect a 
manipulation.’291
This is making existing legislation and regulation around elections seem outdated 
and inconsequential. How, for example, is it possible to track campaign spending 
per constituency across social and search platforms? Given the lack of transparency 
of communication via certain social media platforms, how is it possible to monitor 
the accuracy of party communication? Should information intermediaries make 
commitments, prior to an election, that they will not discriminate who they prompt to 
vote? Should these organisations have to make public the relationships with different 
political parties and what these involve? Or perhaps these organisations should have 
positive responsibilities to provide people with information about candidates?
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6. The power to hold power to account
Local newspapers across many western democracies have struggled economically for 
well over a decade.292 This is, in part, due to structural changes that make it difficult 
to support local news businesses as in the twentieth century. This has led to a decline 
in the number of professional local journalists in western democratic countries, 
particularly those reporting issues of public interest.293 A failure to report from local 
councils, from public meetings and on public authorities has sparked anxiety about 
the accountability of these public bodies and the services they provide.294
Information intermediaries believe they represent part of the answer. The access to 
information they provide and the tools to interrogate enable, they say, a new type of 
accountability through transparency. As the Executive Chairman of Alphabet, Eric 
Schmidt, writes: ‘A shopkeeper in Addis Ababa and a precocious teenager in San 
Salvador will be able to disseminate information about bribes and corruption, report 
election irregularities and generally hold they governments to account’.295
Facebook believes something similar, including in its SEC filing statement for 
its IPO in 2012: ‘We believe building tools to help people share can bring a more 
honest and transparent dialogue around government that could lead to more direct 
empowerment of people, more accountability for officials and better solutions to some 
of the biggest problems of our time’.296
This concept, of a ‘Fifth Estate’ that could provide a complement or alternative 
to the Fourth Estate, was proposed by the Oxford Internet Institute’s Bill Dutton in 
relation to the internet back in 2007. A ‘new form of social accountability is emerging’ 
he said in his inaugural lecture, ‘what I am calling the ‘Fifth Estate’ … I will argue that 
this could be as important – if not more so – to the 21st century as the Fourth Estate 
has been since the 18th’.297 
There are already numerous examples of public figures exposed or chastened on 
these digital platforms. Mitt Romney was caught on film published on YouTube 
before the 2012 election talking about the 47 per cent of Americans it was his job ‘not 
to worry about’. John Galliano’s anti-semitic comments at a café in Paris were filmed 
by a contributor to Citizenside and published online.298 Emily Thornberry, a Labour 
politician, resigned from the shadow Cabinet after she tweeted a misjudged comment 
about a Union Jack draped house in Rochester.299
These services have also provided the platform to distribute videos of human rights 
abuses. Recognizing the need to curate and verify these videos, in 2012 YouTube 
launched a Human Rights Channel, working with Witness and Storyful.300 By 2015 
YouTube claimed to have ‘become a primary home for this powerful, first-person 
documentary footage’ and announced a daily YouTube Newswire, a joint-venture 
Witness Media Lab to ‘focus on human rights struggles as seen from the perspective of 
those who live, witness, and experience them’, and a ‘First Draft Coalition’ of experts 
to provide tools and advice on verification and security.301
YouTube may be the primary platform for eyewitness human rights videos, but 
many are also documented on Twitter, Facebook and other platforms. Madeleine Bair, 
who leads the Media Witness Lab, notes that video of a fatal police shooting in Los 
Angeles in March 2015 was first uploaded onto Facebook.302 
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From a civic perspective this is a positive and powerful new development. The 
opportunity for people to hold authorities, corporations and public figures to account 
with only a smartphone and an internet link is potent and compelling.
Yet it is unclear the extent to which, beyond Google, these organisations either 
acknowledge or accept the risks and responsibilities that accompany their role as 
platforms for the publication and distribution of videos documenting human rights 
abuses or holding public authorities to account. The fatal police shooting video in Los 
Angeles, for example, was subsequently ‘removed from the pages of Facebook users 
who had shared it – without any explanation’.303
Enabling the publication and distribution of these videos puts significant civic 
responsibility in the hands of these organisations. It is within their power to remove 
them – with or without explanation. They can curate and verify them, as YouTube 
has done on the Human Rights Channel, working with Storyful and Witness, or 
simply host them. They can anonymise parts of the content and the publisher, or make 
the identities of the participants and publishers transparent.
Witness has argued the case for ‘visual anonymisation’ of some of those 
filmed within these videos, to prevent protestors being identified and targeted 
by governments and security services.304 The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) found examples of the US government using social networking services for 
investigations.305
As easily as they can enable people to hold public authorities to account, it is 
also in their power to take it away. Twitter chose to remove a service that captured 
embarrassing tweets that were deleted by politicians. ‘Politwoops’ was a service 
provided by the non-profit Sunlight Foundation that ran from 2012 to 2015. In May 
2015 Twitter abruptly blocked Politwoops, indicating that it breached its terms 
of service.306 Seven months later Twitter announced it was reversing its previous 
decision.307
Conversely, once certain platforms become dominant it becomes easier for public 
figures and authorities to reduce or suppress their effectiveness. ‘Virtually any needle 
can be “disappeared” into a haystack of that size’, Frank Pasquale writes of Google’s 
index, ‘it is just too easy for the company to hide content it would rather we didn’t 
see.’308 Jon Ronson writes about the hundreds of thousands of dollars clients of 
reputation services pay in order to obscure search results.309 ‘One of the most notable 
areas of growth [in PR]’ John Lloyd and Laura Toogood write in their study of ‘News 
Media and Public Relations in the Digital Age’, ‘is reputation management.’310
Moreover, once these tools become dominant, they can more easily be used to 
make accountable the non-powerful rather than the reverse. Texas student Monica 
Foy was ‘held accountable’ by Twitter users for her offhand tweet about the shooting 
of a police officer. Following her tweet she was arrested (not for the tweet but for an 
earlier misdemeanor) and received numerous death threats.311 Lindsey Stone, who 
worked for residence for people with learning difficulties, was ‘held accountable’ for 
photos she posted on Facebook showing her mocking public signs and statues. The 
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outraged reaction led to Stone losing her job, falling into depression and hardly leaving 
her house for almost a year afterwards. She had believed the photos were private.312 
Equally, though these platforms may aid transparency they do not ensure it, and 
though they may help accountability of public authorities, they do not motivate or 
sustain it. When David Cameron first became Prime Minister in the UK in 2010 
he promised to ‘extend transparency as far and as wide as possible’.313 The UK 
government’s hope was that ‘an army of armchair auditors’ would help ‘bring about 
a revolution in town hall openness and accountability’.314 Three years later no such 
army had yet emerged.315 In 2014 the UK Public Administration Commission (PAC) 
concluded that ‘Simply putting data “out there” is not enough to keep Government 
accountable’.316
There are also limits to those one can hold accountable using these tools. Google, 
Facebook, Apple and Amazon are often accused of being overly secretive (though this 
is a charge levelled at many large corporations).317 However, in their case, there are 
reasons why a news organisation might be more reluctant to scrutinize them. Many 
news organisations have commercial relationships with the platforms (for example via 
Instant Articles), and many rely on them for advertising. More significantly, since they 
increasingly depend on them for distribution of their news, they may be wary that – 
should they critique them – it could affect their visibility on those platforms.
It is similarly important to note that these tech organisations, while they may 
like the concept of a Fifth Estate, do not define themselves in the same way as the 
existing Fourth Estate. Most importantly, their sense of identity is not inextricably 
linked to their independence from the State, as in the case of traditional journalism 
organisations. To date, most of them do not appear to believe that, to serve their 
purpose, they must remain separate, in conflict even, with government (though 
this may be changing since the Snowden revelations). If they do not consciously 
distinguish themselves from government, they will necessarily undermine their 
capacity to act as a new Fourth Estate. Worse, they will risk becoming a Fifth Column 
– collaborating with the State rather than holding it accountable. This helps to explain 
some of the concern about Amazon’s decision to drop Wikileaks from its servers.
The information leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 appeared to reveal that many 
of these large information intermediaries were secretly passing on user information 
to the US government under the PRISM programme (established in 2007). After 
PRISM became known a number of the companies became more transparent about 
the number of user information requests they receive from the US government under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or FISA (see, for example, the Google 
Transparency Report). The intermediaries strongly denied that they have provided 
‘back doors’ by which the US government could access their servers, and complained 
that they were compelled by law to keep the FISA requests secret.
Yet, in many instances, these corporations work directly with government, on 
issues like cybersecurity and crime prediction. There is nothing to suggest that these 
collaborations allow for access to any personal data, though they do require close 
working relationships between government and tech providers that many traditional 
media organisations may find uncomfortable. Microsoft, for example, has Government 
Security Program ‘agreements with over 40 agencies from more than 25 governments 
worldwide’. This includes an agreement with NATO’s cybersecurity wing.318
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Certain information intermediaries market their closeness to government as a mark 
of their trustworthiness: ‘Throughout our history, Microsoft has helped governments 
build and deploy more secure IT infrastructure and services to protect their citizens 
and national economies.”319 Whilst this may enhance their corporate stature in the 
eyes of governments and other corporations, it compromises their capacity to take on 
the mantle of the Fourth Estate.
There are numerous questions raised by this. Who guards the guardians and holds 
these tech organisations to account? How can we be sure of their independence 
from government when they do not define themselves in these terms? How can tech 
companies reassure people that they will put the public interest over corporate or 
state interests when it comes to publication? Can a new Fifth Estate supplement and 
support the Fourth Estate in holding power to account, or will it simply displace it?
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The services provided by these organisations have transformed our lives. Most 
of us still view these tools simply as ways in which to make our lives easier, 
to communicate more effectively, to shop more conveniently. They are also 
transforming how we pay for things, how we monitor our health, and how we 
travel. Yet, in addition, they are serving civic purposes that are important to 
the functioning of our political and social lives. This study has shown that these 
organisations are performing at least six important civic functions: commanding 
public attention, communicating news, enabling the co-ordination of collective 
action, giving people a voice, influencing people’s vote, and helping hold power to 
account.
When set out in this way these functions appear remarkably similar to those we 
normally associate with the Fourth Estate. To date this has rarely been recognized or 
acknowledged. If we are to understand how these functions are evolving and what the 
implications are then it ought to be made more explicit. The tech giants and their tools 
are indeed taking on many of these roles, though performing them in a different way, 
doing them less self-consciously, and interpreting their responsibilities differently.
In acquiring these functions the tech giants have also acquired power. Some of this 
power has shifted from old media, such as the power to communicate news. Some of 
the power is new – in form if not in purpose – such as enabling co-ordinated collective 
action. This power brings with it huge potential to be a positive and constructive 
force, as well as power to be negative or destructive.
The degree to which they serve these purposes will almost certainly increase – 
the more they know, the more people they serve, the more useful their services can 
potentially be. At the same time it will become more difficult for smaller organisations 
to compete on an equivalent basis, lacking the networks, the intelligence and the 
scale. These organisations have reached such a size that the market will not act as 
a corrective on its own. Lacking equivalent options, democratic governments and 
publics will rely on them still further.
Yet just as these organisations can provide civic functions, so they can choose not 
to provide them. It is their choice. After terrorists shot and killed 130 people in Paris 
on 13 November 2015 Facebook activated its Safety Check service. Thanks to the 
service many people were able to find out if members of their family or their friends 
were safe and to locate them. This was the first time the service had been active after 
a terrorist attack, previously it had only been turned on following natural disasters.320 
Why, people asked after Paris, did Facebook not start it following other similar 
tragedies, like the ISIS bombings in Beirut the previous week? Facebook responded, 
saying that they would change their policy and activate the service ‘for other serious 
and tragic incidents in the future’. In each case it will, of course, be Facebook’s 
decision whether to turn it on or not to turn it on. This, as Zeynep Tufekci writes 
‘demonstrates the profoundly political nature of the choices made by major internet 
platforms.’321 It also demonstrates the significant power these platforms have.
As our societies become increasingly digital and ‘smart’ we may find ourselves 
relying on these organisations for our infrastructure in addition to their civic roles. 
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This raises still further questions as to our dependence on them, as Evgeny Morozov 
writes:
‘the issue of whether we want a company like Google that already has access 
to an enormous reservoir of personal information to continue its expansion 
and become the default provider of infrastructure—in health, education and 
everything else—for the twenty-first century’322
At the very least, democratic societies need to explore the dangers of such 
dependence. If a service collapses or becomes unavailable, do we do without it until 
the market comes up with an alternative? If certain organisations offer their services 
in exchange for personal information, are we comfortable that it is a fair exchange? 
Should our public sphere become increasingly atomized and disconnected, should 
we try to create new, shared digital public spaces? Are we concerned about the 
privatisation of public goods?
‘In our dependence,’ Rebecca MacKinnon writes, ‘we have a problem: we 
understand how power works in the physical world, but we do not yet have a clear 
understanding of how power works in the digital realm.’323
In his landmark book The Master Switch, Tim Wu shows how various information 
and communication empires have gone through a series of cycles in their history. From 
an open, highly inventive and slightly chaotic phase towards a more closed phase 
characterized by industry consolidation, often with the support of government. This 
is then followed by a third, disruptive phase driven by technological change or by 
government led break-up (for example in the form of antitrust).324
On this basis, with respect to the internet, we appear to be moving into the 
second phase, in which a small number of large corporations dominate, and where 
governments seek ways with which to contain, direct or collaborate with those 
corporations. Organisations cannot reach this scale and size, and accumulate this 
much power without provoking a response - from national and regional governments, 
from other industries, and from the public.
Indeed governments have already responded, and found ways in which to 
collaborate with these companies, as we learnt from the materials leaked by Edward 
Snowden in 2013. Yet this type of collaboration, of democratic states working closely 
with corporations that have such detailed knowledge of the minutiae of our political 
and social lives, raises a rather frightening prospect that neither George Orwell or 
Aldous Huxley fully imagined. A world in which governments have access to all our 
digital information and communication, and therefore almost complete knowledge 
of who we are, who we communicate with, and how we engage with politics – not 
only via their own systems but via those run by the information intermediaries. In 
addition to which, by outsourcing its means of surveillance and control there are few 
democratic mechanisms of transparency or accountability, with many citizens blithely 
unaware it is even happening: Orwell’s 1984 meets Huxley’s Brave New World.
What about the tech organisations themselves? How should they respond? To 
what extent should they acknowledge their growing civic roles and take greater 
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responsibility for them? Should they be investing in news? How should their 
governance make them more accountable for their civic roles? How can they make 
themselves more responsible to those who rely on their services? Right now the public 
has little say in how they use their power, or adapt it, or evolve it; nor are the public 
aware of the values to which they ascribe. This would be of less importance if these 
organisations were not so dominant in the digital world.
Partly, this comes down to a question of trust. These organisations would like 
people and governments to trust them. ‘Google depends for its continued success 
on users and governments that trust it will not abuse this knowledge.’325 President of 
Alphabet, Sergey Brin, agrees: ‘We wouldn’t survive if people didn’t trust us’ he told 
the audience at the Code Conference 2014.326 Much of this trust derives from the 
individuals that lead the organisations – from Sergey and Larry, from Mark and Jeff. 
Eric Schmidt, executive Chairman of Alphabet reinforced this when he told a reporter 
– “Evil is what Sergey [Brin] says is evil.”327
Yet placing such a degree of trust in an individual, Shoshana Zuboff writes, may 
be seen as ‘the quintessence of absolutism.’328 It is also highly precarious. Google’s 
2014 capitalization Annual Report acknowledged this explicitly by noting that ‘The 
loss of key personnel could seriously harm our business’, in particular ‘Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin are critical to the overall management of Google and the development of 
our technology’. Neither is it helped by the opaqueness of most of these firms. The 
academic and journalist John Naughton has noted how Google and Facebook are 
‘pathologically secretive about their long-term aspirations and strategies’ and likens 
reporting on them to Kremlinology during the Cold War.329
Our trust has also taken a knock in recent years. The files released by Edward 
Snowden in 2013 appeared to show that many of the tech giants had been 
collaborating – willingly or unwillingly – with the US government. The firms 
themselves denied such collaboration. 
Eventually, inevitably, trust in these organisations will not be enough. Trust 
will erode and dissipate. As commercial companies these organisations will seek 
to maintain profits and shareholder returns. This will lead them to do some things 
that citizens do not like or are uncomfortable with – particularly as regards civic 
role and responsibilities. In order to increase revenues, for example, they are likely 
to seek to gain more financially from their knowledge about individuals. They will 
make decisions about what should command public attention about which people 
will disagree. They may share information with governments, political parties or 
authorities that is then used in a repressive or exploitative way. Their dominance will 
mean some of these actions have significant implications, but there will be little that 
citizens can do about them. Once trust erodes, or is undermined, what next?
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‘I do not divide monopolies in private hands into good monopolies and bad 
monopolies. There is no good monopoly in private hands. There can be no good 
monopoly in private hands until the Almighty sends us angels to preside over the 
monopoly. There may be a despot who is better than another despot, but there is 
no good despotism’
William Jennings Bryan, speech, 1899, quoted in Hofstadter (2008)
The digital world is currently out of joint. A small number of tech companies are 
very large, dominant and growing. They have not just commercial influence, but 
an impact on our privacy, our freedom of expression, our security, and – as this 
study has shown – on our civic society. Even if they mean to have a positive and 
constructive societal impact – as they make clear they do – they are too big and 
have too great an influence to escape the attention of governments, democratic 
and non-democratic. Governments have already responded, and more will.
Most of these government responses are destined to fail. They are destined to fail 
for three reasons: they have not yet adequately defined the problem they are trying 
to solve; they are using tools that are not suited to dealing with these organisations 
and the services they provide; and they do not have a vision of where they would like 
digital society to end up.
On the first, the problem, this is generally defined narrowly in terms of privacy, 
security, and economics. Debates on privacy centre on the collection and use of 
personal data by the tech giants. Those on security focus on the extent to which 
governments should or should not have access to that personal data. Economic 
questions relate chiefly to tax and the degree to which the tech giants may be unfairly 
promoting their own services over those of their competitors.
The antitrust case launched by the European Commission against Google in April 
2015, for example, centres on the extent to which Google was, or was not, using 
its position as an intermediary to promote its own shopping service over those of its 
competitors. The Commission claimed that Google had ‘abused its dominant position 
in the markets for general internet search services in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) by systematically favouring its own comparison shopping product in its general 
search results pages.’330 The Commission may, or may not, be able to show the tech 
giant biased its results to its own service, but it will much harder to demonstrate how 
this this hurt the end user, particularly given that the service is provided free at the 
point of use.
This is why, as this study has shown, the problem also needs to be framed in civic 
terms. It needs to be recognized that these organisations and their services are starting 
to play significant civic roles in democratic society, and that, in playing these roles, 
they are gaining political and social power. Democratic societies may decide, in some 
cases, that this is a fair trade given the benefits - though there has been precious little 
discussion to date as to the terms of trade and the advantages and disadvantages of 
reliance. In other cases, societies may decide the risks outweigh the benefits. They 
then need to figure out how to respond.
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Working out how to respond will not be straightforward. The tools currently 
available to democratic governments – including legislation, regulation and taxation 
– are not well suited to dealing with the issues raised by the tech giants. These 
organisations are very large and transnational, often work to a different economic 
model to other corporations, and work in a communications environment that is 
fundamentally different from their predecessors. Until we better understand and 
communicate the dilemmas they raise, and until the public become concerned 
about the potential – or actual – threats they represent, it will be difficult to respond 
effectively.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, antitrust law was applied more 
successfully once the problem of ‘bigness’ – that the law was introduced to address – 
was more carefully investigated and exposed. In January 1903, for example, the first 
of Ida Tarbell’s ‘muckraking’ investigations of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil was 
published in McClure’s magazine. In this, and her following articles, Tarbell detailed 
how the rise to dominance of Standard Oil ‘was aided at every stage by discriminatory 
railroad rates and illegal tactics – bribery, fraud, criminal underselling and 
intimidation.’331 Such was the popular response to Tarbell’s investigations that she was 
lauded as the ‘Joan of Arc among moderns’ and ‘one of the most commanding figures 
in American letters.’332 Her exposure of Standard Oil’s history and practices helped 
Theodore Roosevelt steer his bills against trusts through Congress – on rail rebates, 
on the expedition of antitrust action, and on the establishment of a Department of 
Commerce with a Bureau of Corporations that had powers to investigate trusts. Eight 
years later, the US Supreme Court ruled that Standard Oil had abused its dominant 
position and should be broken up. It was the combination of the investigation, the 
exposure, and the public response that enabled political action to be taken. There has, 
as yet, been no twenty first century equivalent of Ida Tarbell’s investigations into the 
tech giants.
Democratic societies also need a much clearer vision of where they would like to 
end up. What would a progressive digital future look like? How should plurality and 
diversity be defined in an age of information abundance? Should the digital civic 
landscape be devolved or centralized? These democratic objectives will need to 
include the needs of the citizen as well as the consumer, and of civic society as well as 
the security state.
Such a vision ought to be led by the public, and has to take account of the state of 
the digital environment over twenty-five years after the advent of the web. The vision 
is unlikely to include over reliance on a small cadre of transnational tech companies, 
but may well include the convenience and efficiency that comes from using one 
provider for certain services like general search. Without greater clarity on the 
potential consequences of digital dominance, and a clearer vision of where democratic 
societies would like to end up, there is a risk that they jeopardize the tremendous civic 
benefits of digital technology, and fail to build a digital ecosystem that enables civic 
participation while protecting citizen’s rights.
Without devising progressive responses democratic societies will be left with two 
alternatives, neither of which is attractive. They can take a laissez-faire approach, 
accepting that the digital environment will be dominated by a handful of tech giants, 
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and that the most effective way of affecting their behaviour is through persuasion 
and collaboration. Or, they can react regressively to digital developments, banning 
services, imposing punishments and even prosecuting organisations and employees 
who run the tech companies’ tools.
Democratic societies do not yet understand the phenomenon of the tech giants, 
what the phenomenon means in civic terms, what benefits it brings to governance, 
and the dangers inherent in it. Only once they understand the phenomenon better, 
and understand where it can help and where it can damage civic society, will they be 
in a position to work out how best to respond.
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